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Excecutive summary 
This thesis examines the market-based common Swedish-Norwegian tradable electricity 
certificate support scheme for investments in new electricity generating capacity from renewable 
energy sources, with a particular focus on deployment of wind power in Norway. We evaluate 
the costs of onshore wind power projects in the pipeline and their potential to contribute to the 
quantitative target of adding new renewable electricity generation corresponding to 26.4 TWh 
per year by 2020. We present relevant theory on electricity certificate markets and available data 
on the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market. We show how several features of the 
policy design are likely to result in high risk and uncertainty to potential investors. In particular, 
there is a risk of overshooting the quantitative target, resulting in certificate price spoilage, due to 
a lack of information regarding the supply and demand for electricity certificates over the 
duration of the scheme. The large electricity generation potential of the projects in the pipeline 
reinforces the risk of overinvestment. Risk and uncertainty is likely to contribute to high risk-
premiums and increase the capital costs of new investment. These costs, which ultimately are 
covered by the electricity consumers in Norway and Sweden, have the potential to weaken the 
cost-effectiveness of the policy. Improved systems for information in the market, increased 
transparency in electricity certificate trade and more frequent corrections of demand deviation 
are suggested as viable measures that the regulators can take in order to reduce risk and 
uncertainty faced by the market participants.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Market background 
The global trend of implementing environmental policy measures has come as a result of the 
need to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the human impact on the climate. Promoting 
the deployment of renewable energy sources for electricity production (RES-E) has been 
recognised as an important measure due to the low carbon footprint of such technologies. 
Historically, Norway has had sufficient hydropower capacity to cover electricity demand and has 
not had the need for or willingness to set ambitious targets for RES-E deployment beyond what 
is economically profitable based on revenues from power sale. As a result of negotiations with 
the EU, Norway implemented the EU Renewable Energy Directive with a binding national target 
of increasing its share of renewable energy use from 58% in 2005 to 67.5% by 2020, which is 
roughly calculated as the renewable energy production plus the direct use of bio energy divided 
by the total energy consumption (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2009). In addition to GHG 
emissions reduction, the renewables target may be seen as a way of reducing local air pollution, 
promoting job opportunities, regional development and industries, as well as adding to the power 
balance and strengthening the security of supply. 
 
Recognising that wind power and other RES-E technologies typically remains uncompetitive at 
current electricity wholesale prices, Norway chose a marked based incentive scheme to promote 
RES-E deployment were suggested. In December 2010, Norway and Sweden signed a protocol 
to create a common tradable electricity certificate market that has been in operation since 
January 2012. The policy is designed to promote new, RES-E projects corresponding to 26.4 
TWh of electricity generation per year by 2020 in the common market. Prescribed by the 
Electricity Certificate Act, Norway and Sweden are each financing 13.2 TWh of the new RES-E 
capacity, irrespective of the location of the new production capacity (Olje- og 
energidepartementet, 2012).  
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The thesis aims to clarify how the common Swedish-Norwegian tradable electricity certificate 
market works, evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the policy instrument, the main challenges for 
potential investors in new RES-E generation capacity and how the market risk and uncertainty in 
the regulatory framework affect investment behaviour and potentially the policy outcome. 
Throughout the thesis, we will use onshore wind power projects in Norway as a base case. 
1.2 Purpose and structure 
There is a sizeable amount of potential wind power projects in Norway that have a licence to 
build, but seem to face challenges in reaching a positive investment decision. The motivation for 
the thesis is to identify the challenges to investors in new RES-E capacity under the Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market, and elaborate on risks and uncertainty in the current 
market conditions, focusing on regulatory risk, market and operational risks and technology risk. 
We discuss how the perceived risks and uncertainty in the market may affect the decision to 
invest in RES-E technologies, and the effect of an uncertain investment level on the policy 
outcome. Lastly, we evaluate how and whether the regulatory framework could be altered in 
order to reduce the risk and uncertainty faced by the market participants. In short, the thesis aim 
to answer the following: 
 
How does the risk to investors in new RES-E generation capacity under the common Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market affect investment behaviour, and the policy outcome?  
 
Cleijne and Ruijgrok (2004) suggest that risk in relation to investments in renewable energy 
projects can be defined as uncertainties in future developments which have a negative impact on 
the operation and profit of a company. We suggest that three types of risks should be rewarded in 
the case of RES-E projects, namely technology risks, market and operational risks and regulatory 
risk. Technology risk is related to uncertainty in the development of technology costs and 
efficiency over time due to technology learning. Market and operational risk includes factors that 
can influence the performance of a power producer during normal operation, including price risk 
and volume risk in both inputs and outputs in the power market. For RES-E generators, price and 
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volume risk in the market for electricity certificates is also prevalent. Uncertainties related to the 
current regulatory framework and expectations regarding support for RES-E investments in the 
future is referred to as regulatory uncertainty.  
 
In section 2, we consider the RES-E project pipeline, the investment decision process and the 
role of different types of RES-E investors and financiers. In section 3, the cost structure of RES-
E technologies and the expected development of energy costs are considered. In section 4 we 
consider the Nordic electricity market, with a particular focus on how power prices are formed 
and how uncertain and volatile prices can be hedged in the financial market. Section 5 is 
concerned with the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market. In sections 6, 7 and 8, we 
outline the risk and uncertainty faced by RES-E investors and financiers who operate in the 
electricity certificate market, how the risk and uncertainty could affect policy outcome, and we 
suggest potential risk reducing alterations to the policy design. 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
The thesis assess the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market analytically with the 
objective to illustrate how the mechanism encourages investments in new RES-E technologies, 
in particular onshore wind power in Norway. It describes the challenges faced by different 
market participants and how risk and uncertainty may affect the market performance and policy 
outcome. 
 
We do not engage in comparing the policy measure employed in Norway/Sweden to alternative 
policies to stimulate RES-E investments. Moreover, we study investments in RES-E production 
plants and not investments into RES-E technology development. In the thesis, the renewable 
target is taken as a premise and we will neither question whether a renewable target must be part 
of an efficient climate policy nor the motivation behind supporting the deployment of RES-E 
technologies. Furthermore, it is not discussed whether the quantitative mandate for RES-E 
deployment agreed in the common Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market is the best 
approach for Norway and Sweden to reach their respective renewables targets. Moreover, the 
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effect of RES-E deployment on the global CO2 emission level or complementary environmental 
policies such as energy efficiency schemes or CO2 emissions trading is not studied. 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
2 Market background 
2.1 The RES-E project pipeline 
In this section, we describe the process from planning a RES-E project through the stages leading 
up to the potential realization. We first consider the concession process in Norway and the 
current status of Norwegian onshore wind power projects in the concession process. Moreover, 
we describe the project pipeline of onshore wind power projects in Norway, and evaluate the 
scope of potential new RES-E projects that could come online in Norway and Sweden by 2020. 
 
A concession, which is the same as a permission, permit or license, is generally needed in order 
to build a power plant. In Norway, the first instance authority to grant licenses is the Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Directorate, from now on referred to as NVE. Concessions are 
issued on the basis of economical viability and an environmental impact assessment. The process 
of obtaining a licence starts with a notification from the developer to NVE, a preliminary 
assessment and a formal application from the developer including an impact assessment. The 
license application is approved or a rejected by NVE and either way, the decision may be subject 
to appeals that are handled by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, from now on referred to as 
OED. The concession process in Norway is fully transparent and to a large extent centralized 
(NVE e, 2015). The Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten) has a similar function in 
Sweden, however the concession process is less centralized in Sweden where municipalities have 
a more formal role in the ruling.  
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Figure 1: Current status of concession process for onshore wind projects (NVE b, 2015) 
Figure 1 illustrates the current status1 of onshore wind power projects in Norway that can be 
found at different stages in the concession process, either at NVE or OED. The description of the 
concession process in Figure 1 is static and each project only appears at one stage. Thus, it 
neither captures how much time the projects spend at the different stages nor their probability of 
receiving a licence. The concession processing time can vary significantly across projects, and in 
the period 2009-2013, the average concession process in Norway was 5.5 years for wind power 
projects and 3.5 years for small-scale hydropower projects, with an additional two years in the 
                                            
 
1 The current status per April 21, 2015, provided in a detailed listing of the NVE concession process (NVE b, 2015). 
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case of appeals handled by OED (Riksrevisjonen, 2014). Currently, 68 active2 projects have a 
license from NVE, with a total installed capacity of 5,738 MW and an electricity generation 
potential of more than 16 TWh in total. However, 26 projects are appealed to OED and projects 
that are denied a licence from NVE may still be granted licence from OED after an appeal 
process. We consider the amount of wind power projects that have a licence to be sizeable.  
 
For a wind power investor, the complete process from the early sketch phase to the plant is in 
operation is far more extensive than the concession process. Hours of preliminary site studies are 
necessary prior to the licence processing in NVE, and only after a licence is secured is the 
investor in the clear to make an investment decision, enter into contracts with equipment 
suppliers and secure financing. An illustration of the pipeline stages that onshore wind power 
projects may be in is shown in Figure 2:  
 
 
Figure 2: Project pipeline onshore wind power Norway 
The thesis focus is on the investment decision process following a granted licence. Nonetheless, 
considering the total project pipeline of all RES-E projects in Norway and Sweden is crucial in 
order to evaluate which projects have the potential to be realized and enter the Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market by 2020.  
 
In 2014, NVE conducted a quantitative analysis of the volume of RES-E projects possible to 
invest in by the end of 2020, under the condition that they are granted a licence and access to the 
central grid. NVE estimate that current and future licence rulings can deliver project licences in 
                                            
 
2 An additional 2 projects have a license from NVE, but the developer has concluded the project planning. 
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due time before the end of 20203 corresponding to an annual potential production of 27 TWh 
from new wind- and hydropower projects. By taking into consideration restrictions in the central 
grid, NVE conclude that with today’s central grid capacity, only 11.9 TWh of the potential 
generation capacity could come online by 2020, whereas over 20 TWh are considered 
“investable” by the end of 2020 provided that all planned investments in the central grid are 
implemented by 2019 (NVE c, 2014). The “investable” volume must be understood as an 
estimate of projects expected to be granted a licence and grid access and therefore is considered 
possible to invest in by the end of 2020. It should not be confused with an investment prognosis, 
which unarguably relies on additional factors such as economical viability and access to funding. 
In a similar analysis, the Swedish Energy Agency have estimated that the volume of investable 
new RES-E projects could contribute to an estimated annual electricity generation of 17 TWh 
onshore wind and 8.5 TWh offshore wind power projects, 3.5 TWh from biomass and 1.1 TWh 
from hydropower (Energimyndigheten a, 2014). We will apply these estimates of realisable (by 
2020) potential RES-E generation capacity when we later evaluate the scope of new RES-E 
project to come online under the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market by 2020. NVE 
and the Swedish Energy Agency estimate that over 50 TWh of new RES-E generation capacity 
in total is investable by 2020 in Norway and Sweden, thus our key takeaways from this section is 
that there is clearly a sufficient amount of available RES-E projects in order to meet the RES-E 
quantitative mandate of 26.4 TWh by 2020 in the common Swedish-Norwegian electricity 
certificate market. However, the concession process and grid expansion could prove to be a 
bottleneck for many RES-E projects. 
2.2 The investment decision process 
In general, an investment is a decision that locks in liquid assets, such as capital, into something 
that generates a cash flow to be returned to the owner that is expected to have a larger net present 
value than the initial investment. Since the investment today is compared with an uncertain 
                                            
 
3 NVE assume the time from the project is granted a final licence to commissioning to be 2.5-3.5 years for small-
scale hydropower projects and 2 years for wind power projects.   
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future cash flow, investors will require a risk premium, captured by the discount rate. Profit 
maximizing, rational investors will make their investment decision based on a profitability 
calculation such as the Net Present Value (NPV) approach:  
 
𝑉!"# = −𝐼 + 𝐶!(1+ 𝑟)!!!!!  
 
Where  𝐼 is the initial capital investment, and 𝐶! the annual expected cash flow discounted at a 
rate 𝑟 over the  project lifetime  𝑇. 
 
A licence to develop a wind farm or alternative RES-E project may be valued as a real option, 
implying that the investor owns an exclusive right, but not an obligation, to pay the investment 
cost needed to receive the present value of the project. An investment is generally considered 
irreversible and hence the flexibility of the real option is applicable in the investment decision 
phase (Fleten & Ringen, 2009). By deferring an investment decision, the investor can potentially 
reduce the uncertainty in future costs and revenues. A value of waiting may for example arise 
from a possible implementation of a new support scheme (Linnerud, Fleten, & Andersson, 
2014), the prospect of higher future subsidies or an expected release of a more efficient wind 
turbine (Narbel, Lien, & Hansen, 2014). The real option value investment rule can take the value 
of waiting into account by integrating it into the simple NPV investment rule and may 
significantly affect the optimal timing of the investment. 
2.3 Debt and equity providers 
Access to capital and funding is necessary for taking an investment decision. In the capital 
markets, only the best projects will attract capital. In order to study RES-E investments, an 
understanding of who the investors that provide equity and financiers who provide debt are, is 
needed. Lenders and equity providers tend to include different criteria in their analysis of project 
performance. Equity providers have the potential for unbounded return and are willing to take on 
risk if the potential upside is large. Lenders do not face a similar upward potential and will 
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therefore seek to remove risk that can threaten the project cash flow. Up to a limit of 
unacceptable risk, lenders will charge a higher interest rate and stricter terms on investments that 
are perceived more risky. Factors such as stricter requirements on banks and changes in the 
investment environment thus impact the development of new RES-E in Norway and Sweden. 
 
Different types of investors may be involved in a RES-E project at different stages in the project 
pipeline. Equity investors can vary from power companies to pension funds depending on where 
the project is in its lifetime. In the early stages of planning and construction, project developers 
are typically involved, securing finance and early operation. The planning phase is considered 
highly risky to the developer due to the possibility that the project never leaves the drawing 
board. Once a project is constructed and enters normal operation, other equity contributors, such 
as pension funds, insurance companies or municipalities could replace the developer (Dunlop, 
2006). The typical debt providers are banks or bond issuers that lend capital to a project. Debt 
providers generally get involved in the final phase of the planning process. The main difference 
between equity and debt providers is that debt owners get their principal returned at maturity in 
addition to the interest, and that they have first priority on the cash flow. Equity providers, on the 
other hand, receive what is left of the cash flow when the debt is paid, and they do not 
necessarily get the principal returned at the end of the project lifetime.  
2.4 The role of different types of RES-E investors 
An understanding of different types of RES-E investors in Norway and Sweden is needed in 
order to study potential investments in new RES-E and investment behaviour in terms of risk. 
Policymakers should find it relevant because RES-E support schemes affect the investment 
behaviour of a heterogeneous group of investors differently.  
 
Bergek et al (2013) have conducted a detailed empirical study on the heterogeneity of RES-E 
investors in Sweden in a categorization presented in Table 1: 
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Name	   Description	  
Utility	  type	   State	  or	  privately	  owned	  utilities,	  privately	  owned	  energy	  companies	  and	  municipal	  
energy	  companies,	  who	  owned	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks	  for	  
electricity,	  the	  local	  heating	  system	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  electricity	  production	  
capacity	  prior	  to	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  in	  Sweden.	  
Publicly	  owned	  non-­‐
energy	  companies	  
Companies	  or	  organizations	  owned	  or	  controlled	  by	  national,	  regional	  or	  municipal	  
governments,	  with	  another	  main	  area	  of	  business.	  
Independent	  power	  
producers	  (IPPs)	  
Privately	  owned	  companies	  whose	  main	  area	  of	  business	  is	  electricity	  production.	  
Farmers	   Privately	  owned	  companies,	  sloe	  traders	  or	  partnerships	  whose	  main	  area	  of	  
business	  is	  agriculture	  (e.g.	  grains	  or	  animal	  keeping).	  
Diversified	  companies	   Privately	  owned	  companies	  with	  other	  main	  area	  of	  business	  than	  energy	  
production	  (e.g.	  Pulp	  and	  paper).	  
Power	  project	  
developers	  
Privately	  owned	  companies	  whose	  main	  area	  of	  business	  is	  to	  plan,	  build	  and	  
initially	  operate	  power	  plants	  for	  other	  owners.	  
Sole	  traders	   Individuals	  or	  partnerships	  owning	  one	  or	  several	  power	  production	  plants;	  
specialized	  on	  this	  or	  with	  other	  main	  area	  of	  activity.	  
Associations	   Associations,	  e.g.	  economic	  associations	  and	  churches	  that	  own	  one	  or	  several	  
power	  plants.	  
Table 1: Categories of RES-E investors (Bergek, Mignon, & Sundberg, 2013) 
 
The main finding of the study is that investors with non-traditional background in electricity 
generation are responsible for an increasing share of RES-E investments in Sweden. Utility type 
investors have decreased their overall share of total investment in RES-E capacity, although they 
remain the dominant investor type in biomass and hydropower projects. Independent power 
producers increasingly dominate wind energy projects, although wind power investors are a 
diverse group. Adjusting for the project size in terms of installed capacity, the study shows that 
different investor types are involved in different sized projects. Wind projects were on average 2 
MW for utility type investors, 2.6 MW for project developers and considerably lower with 825 
kW for farmers. The study concludes that RES-E investors are a heterogeneous group with 
different market experience, risk profiles, access to information, motives and access to finance 
and alternative investments (Bergek, Mignon, & Sundberg, 2013).  
 
In a recent study, Linnerud et al. (2014) followed potential investors with licences to construct 
small run-of-the-river hydropower plants, aiming to examine whether the prospect of the 
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common Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market affected their investment timing. 
Local landowners generally control the resource, and can choose whether to manage the resource 
themselves, or have a professional party to manage the resource. In the study, the projects are 
categorized into two models for ownership and operation under the labels ‘non-professional 
investor’ and ‘professional investor’ depending on project characteristics (e.g. profitability, risk 
and size) and/or characteristics of the group of local landowners (e.g. risk preference and access 
to funding). Among their results, traditional utilities and other professional investors in the 
energy market practiced a real options approach, implying that the expectation of future 
subsidies delayed their investment decision. Farmers and other non-professional investors, on the 
other hand, treated the investment decision more in line with a simple NPV approach, 
consequently ignoring the opportunity to create additional value by incorporate timing 
considerations in their investment decisions. Moreover, they found that non-professional 
investors are generally involved in smaller hydropower projects than professional utility type 
investors (Linnerud, Fleten, & Andersson, 2014). To our knowledge, no similar study on the 
investment behaviour of potential investors in Norwegian onshore wind power projects is 
conducted. However, the results may be relevant for wind power investments since such 
investments are also available for both small, private investors and large utilities.  
2.5  Investor types in Norwegian wind power projects 
We review the ownership structures Norwegian wind power projects that have the potential to be 
included in the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate system. We rely on the classification 
framework of Bergek et al. (2013), presented in Table 1. Although the selection is insufficient 
for generalisation, we believe that it is worthwhile in order to understand what types of investors 
are currently involved in Norwegian wind power projects. Since the review is static, it will not 
capture possible dynamics of ownership changes over the project lifetime. 
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First, we consider the wind parks in Norway that are currently recipients of electricity 
certificates. Raggovidda wind farm and Midtfjellet wind park4 are considered the only 
commercially sized wind parks in Norway that has been developed on the basis of the common 
electricity certificate system. In addition, two smaller wind power plants are recipients of 
electricity certificates, of which Valsneset is a single prototype wind turbine. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the investor type owner categories: 
 
Wind	  power	  
project	  
Installed	  
capacity	   Owner	   Shareholders	   Ownership	  category	  
Midtfjellet	   	  57.5	  MW	   Midtfjellet	  Vindkraft	  AS	   Fitjar	  Kraftlag	  SA,	  	  
Østfold	  Energi	  Vind	  AS,	  	  
Vardar	  Boreas	  AS,	  	  
EB	  Kraftproduksjon	  AS	  
Utility	  types	  (municipal	  
energy	  companies)	  
Raggovidda	   45	  MW	   Varanger	  KraftVind	  AS	   Varanger	  Kraft	  AS	   Utility	  types	  (municipal	  
energy	  companies)	  
Valsneset	   3	  MW	   Blaaster	  Valsneset	  AS	   Blaaster	  Wind	  
Technologies	  AS	  	  
Independent	  power	  
producer	  (test	  facility)	  
Åsen	  II	   1.6	  MW	   Solvind	  Åsen	  AS	   Solvind	  Project	  AS,	  Solvind	  
AS	  and	  private	  investors	  
Independent	  power	  
producer	  
Table 2: Norwegian wind power generators under the electricity certificate scheme.  
 
Since the thesis focus is on potential investments in wind power and other RES-E projects, we 
are interested in the investor types of the projects that are in the pipeline. The following review is 
limited to the 68 onshore wind power projects in Norway that currently have a licence from 
NVE, but have not yet reached an investment decision. What is important to note about these 
projects, is that the ownership stakes are not necessarily established since an investment decision 
is not reached. The ownership structures of some wind power projects can be somewhat 
complex. Many wind power projects are organized as project companies with the sole purpose of 
constructing and operating a wind farm. The project company can be owned by several energy 
companies, which in turn are cooperatives of private investors or have local municipalities or 
                                            
 
4 The total installed capacity of the Midtfjellet wind farm is 110 MW, while only the second stage of construction is 
eligible for electricity certificates, corresponding to 57.5 MW (23 turbines). 
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private investors as shareholders. Such projects are classified according to the parent companies’ 
investor type.   
 
Figure 3: Investor types in onshore wind power projects in Norway 
Figure 3 shows the investor types and their share of the 68 projects in the Norwegian onshore 
wind power pipeline, and the details are provided in Appendix A. Utility type investors are the 
larger contributor to the project pipeline in terms of the number of projects, followed by power 
project developers, independent power producers, diversified companies and publicly owned 
non-energy companies. The utility type investor group is defined broadly, including traditional 
utility type owners, municipal energy companies and professional, international energy 
companies (e.g. E.ON.) Moreover, we find that the wind power projects that we have classified 
as IPPs are typically involved in smaller projects in terms of installed capacity (MW), although a 
few large projects fall under this category. The utility type investors engage in projects with a 
wide range of different sizes and project developers are, on average, involved in the largest wind 
power projects. Diversified companies include two projects initiated by a grocery distributor in 
the wholesale industry (ASKO) whose motivation for investing in wind power is to minimize its 
carbon footprint. The publicly owned non-energy company category comprises one wind power 
project, initiated by Statskog whose main area of business is to manage state property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
From the empirical studies of Linnerud et al. (2014) and Bergek et al. (2013), as well as our own 
review of Norwegian potential wind power projects, it is clear that RES-E investors should be 
treated as a heterogeneous group and that they may have. 
2.6 Financing renewable energy projects  
Debt financing may be provided either through public markets (bonds) or private markets, 
through bank loans and institutional debt (Pickle & Wiser, 1998). Banks have to consider the 
total level of risk in their loan portfolio and by financing RES-E projects, banks expose 
themselves to risks of credit loss, market price volatility, technical and operational failures and 
regulatory changes affecting the project. Identifying, managing and mitigating such risk is a 
fundamental role of a financing institution. RES-E investments in Norway and Sweden are 
usually financed through non-recourse project finance, on-balance sheet corporate financing or 
bonds.  
      
Project financing is a means of financing a project, such as a wind farm, that is separated from 
the investing company by establishing a single purpose entity where several investors can 
partake. Project financing is generally non-recourse, meaning that the financier will take security 
solely in the future cash flows generated during the operation of the entity rather than its 
sponsors’ balance sheets. If the project company should default, the risk and hence the effect on 
the parent company’s creditworthiness is limited since lenders do not have recourse in the parent 
company. With uncertain protracted cash flows, project financing often turns out to be expensive 
because extensive due diligence5 is necessary. Banks will require that a number of measures be 
taken to reduce their exposure to project risks, such as contractual relationships between various 
parties involved in the project. The fundamental principle of project finance is that the various 
risk factors related to the project is be allocated to the party that is best suited to handle and 
control it. Technical risk is generally managed through contracts and insurances, such as 
                                            
 
5 Due diligence is an investigation or audit of potential investment. 
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procurement and construction contracts to remove risk associated with the project development 
and construction phase. With uncertain or unspecified revenue streams, banks are likely to 
require that financial instruments be used to secure stable cash flows, such as long-term power 
purchase agreement (PPA). Some downsides to project financing may be large transaction costs, 
higher debt costs and extensive loan covenants (Pickle & Wiser, 1998). 
 
Corporate financing refers to investments that are financed across the balance sheet6 of the 
project developer, and lenders therefore consider the entire balance sheet for assurance that the 
firm is able to repay its debt. If the company has a high credit rating, the bank is generally 
willing to lend more capital at more attractive interest rates. However, higher debt implies higher 
payables and lenders will therefore restrict the issuing of company debt beyond certain limits 
(Pickle & Wiser, 1998). Banks are exposed to regulatory and legal liquidity requirements that 
may affect their appetite for financing RES-E investments. An example is the Basel accords, 
which requires that banks set aside adequate capital for financial and operational risk in their 
loan portfolio. Since banks face stricter capital and liquidity requirements, available capital for 
bank financing of renewable energy projects is likely to be restricted. This may make financing 
more expensive for capital-intensive RES-E technologies that generally rely on long-term 
financing. Due to stricter regulations that favour large players with strong balance sheet, 
traditional bank financing can prove challenging for high capital cost projects (Narbel, 2013).  
 
The bonds market is becoming an increasingly important source of funding RES-E projects, and 
in 2014, the debt issued as (corporate) bonds by Norwegian utilities amounted to approximately 
NOK 80 billion in bonds with maturity greater than one year, and NOK 10 billion in bonds with 
a shorter maturity (DNB, 2015). Bond investors face strict solvency rules, which imply that they 
                                            
 
6 Financing across the balance sheet means that the external capital (debt) is borrowed against the company’s total 
assets. 
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can only buy bonds from companies with an approved credit rating7. In effect, the bonds market 
is primarily accessible to large players and not appropriate for funding a single wind power 
project in the development and early operating phase. A relatively new approach to financing 
RES-E is through the issuing of Green Bonds. Companies, organisations or public institutions 
can issue green bonds as long as the proceeds are directed at environmentally friendly, 
sustainable purposes. In accordance with International Green Bonds Principles, the best practice 
of labelling a bond “green” involves the approval from a neutral third party. In 2014, EUR 23 
billion worth of green bonds were issued globally and EUR 1.625 billion was issued in the 
Nordic bond market, and the trend is growing, reflecting an increasing international interest in 
sustainable investments (DNB, 2015).  
  
                                            
 
7 In general, credit ratings are comprehensive evaluations of companies’ ability to repay debt, based on its solvency, 
industry risk, cash flow uncertainty and debt to equity ratio. 
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3 Costs    
In this section, we first consider which type of costs is relevant for different decisions, in 
particular the investment decision and short-term operational decisions. We present the 
Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) model, which is regarded as an appropriate measure of Long 
Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). Through a case study of onshore wind power projects in Norway, 
we estimate the LCOE and discuss the sensitivity of the overall energy cost with respect to the 
different parameters. Lastly, we address the technology risk related to potential changes in the 
LCOE parameters over time due to technological progress and industry learning.  
3.1 Relevant costs in the long run and short run 
In the long run, both the composition of and total installed generation capacity can be altered by 
investments or dismantling. Investment decisions are based on a Long Run Marginal Cost 
(LRMC) evaluation, which includes an average per unit repayment of fixed costs, Short Run 
Marginal Costs (SRMC) and average per unit risk premium (Lemming, 2003). The risk premium 
is included in the cost of capital. The investment costs for RES-E generation capacity include the 
costs related to the technology (e.g. wind turbines), land rent, grid connection, equipment, 
licencing and work related to installation and infrastructure, which in total contribute to high 
average fixed costs per unit (Cerdá & del Río, 2014). Investments are generally considered 
irreversible, and once the plant is built the investment cost become a sunk cost that is irrelevant 
for short run decisions. Short run operational decisions are based on the SRMC relative to market 
price. SRMC can be defined as the change in short run total cost for an incremental change in 
output and is directly connected to the operation of the plant. The SRMC encompass variable 
cost of production and in the case of wind power these are the operation and maintenance costs 
(O&M), although fuel cost and opportunity costs are relevant for other technologies.   
3.2 LCOE model and assumptions  
The LCOE model is regarded as a good measure of Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). It can be 
used to compare electricity-producing technologies on a unit cost basis, or rather the average cost 
of generating one MWh of electricity during one year of operation. The LCOE consists of three 
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separate cost components; a capital investment cost, a series of annualized fixed and variable 
operation and maintenance costs (O&M) and fuel costs. The cost components are discounted 
over the power plant lifetime, with a net present value formula that allows for adjustment of 
increases in O&M and fuel cost. The levelized cost of electricity of a power plant can be 
calculated by (Narbel, Lien, & Hansen, 2014): 
 𝐶!"#$ = 𝑅 ∙ 𝑐!𝐻 ∙ 𝑓 + 𝑙 ∙ 𝑐!𝐻 ∙ 𝑓 + 𝑙 ∙ 𝑐!𝐻 ∙ 𝑓  
 𝑅 = 𝑟 ∙ 1+ 𝑟 !1+ 𝑟 ! − 1 
 𝑙 = 𝑟 ∙ 1+ 𝑟 !1+ 𝑟 ! − 1 ∙ 1+ 𝑒𝑟 − 𝑒 1− 1+ 𝑒1+ 𝑟 !  
          
The capital investment cost (𝑐!) is given as a monetary unit by unit of installed capacity (e.g. 
NOK/MW). In order to account for the economic plant life and the time value of money, the 
capital recovery factor (𝑅) is included. The capital recovery factor is the share of the capital cost 
that the revenue from one year of operation needs to cover in order for the project to balance out 
at the end of the plant life and depends on the discount rate (𝑟) and the plant life (𝑇).  
 
The capacity factor (𝑓) is needed to convert the investment cost into an energy unit cost basis 
(e.g. NOK/MWh). The capacity factor expresses the power produced over a period of time as a 
percentage of the theoretical production, as if the plant was running at full capacity over the 
period considered. The typical time period considered is a year (𝐻 = 8,760  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠).  
 
The second cost component represents fixed and variable O&M costs (𝑐!) given as a monetary 
unit by unit of installed capacity (e.g. NOK/MW), and includes both H and capacity factor (𝑓) in 
order to present the cost on an energy unit cost base. The levelization factor (𝑙) depends on the 
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discount rate (𝑟), plant life (𝑇) and escalation rate (𝑒). The escalation rate is the rate at which 
O&M costs are assumed to grow from year to year, for example due to the need for more 
frequent maintenance and a higher risk of major failures as the plant ages. In a similar approach, 
the fuel cost component (𝑐!) can be transformed into a unit cost basis. 
3.3 LCOE limitations 
In reality, a number of other costs than those included in the LCOE model can potentially affect 
profitability, both directly and indirectly. The relevance of such costs could depend on whether 
profitability is considered in a societal or an investor perspective. A policy maker could be 
interested in including environmental externalities of electricity generation, such as CO2 
emissions, noise or environmental destruction. 
 
The LCOE method is static and does not account for specific market risk or technology risk, and 
will not reflect yearly fluctuations in the cost flows. Moreover, the LCOE model ignores costs 
arising in the power system due to the inclusion of new generation capacity. In particular, the 
intermittent production profile of wind power can lead to excessive stress on the power grid and 
increase the need for grid extensions or strengthening. Some of these costs are to a certain extent 
reflected in power market mechanisms and producers’ balancing obligation, yet the 
socioeconomic costs may be substantially higher.  
 
The LCOE model can be expanded or adapted for different purposes, for example including 
applicable tax benefits or other specific financial incentive instruments. Such modifications may 
increase the model relevance to private investors, however, as a basis for decision-making, it 
should be combined with other and more detailed analyses that take greater account of risk and 
uncertainty. Although the LCOE calculations will not provide sufficient information about 
market risk and uncertainty, we consider it an adequate tool for the assessment of the potential of 
projects in the RES-E pipeline to be realized.  
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3.4 LCOE calculations onshore wind 
We provide LCOE calculations for the Norwegian onshore wind power plants that are currently 
in operation and receive electricity certificates for their production and explain the different 
components of the LCOE in relation to wind power projects. We provide LCOE estimates for 
wind power projects in the pipeline that have received a license from NVE and define a reference 
wind power project based on their average parameter values, that we use to describe the LCOE 
sensitivity to changes in the input variables. 
 
We first consider the three commercial wind power plants in Norway that receive electricity 
certificates, which excludes Valsneset testpark constituting a single prototype 3.0 MW wind 
turbine that is a constructed with the purpose of testing, certifying and demonstrating a new 
technology innovation. Total investment and O&M costs are therefore not known, but could be 
expected to be considerably higher than in the case of a commercial wind turbine. The reason for 
looking into the costs of these wind power plants is that they based their investment decision on 
the current support scheme for RES-E, which involve fundamentally different economic 
conditions for investments than wind power plants that came in operation prior to 20128. The 
data we use for the LCOE calculations are based on extended background reports from the NVE 
licencing process, communication with the project owners and the authors’ own assumptions. 
We discuss each of the LCOE parameters in relation to wind power projects and present the 
calculations.  
 
The total capital investment cost comprises various cost components, and Figure 4 illustrates 
their typical shares of the total investment cost: 
                                            
 
8 Wind power projects installed prior to 2012 in Norway received direct governmental funding through ENOVA. 
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Figure 4: Investment cost components (NVE d, 2015) 
 
Total plant costs may vary considerably across projects due to site-specific factors such as grid 
connection and construction costs, which may be larger in areas that are isolated or in rough 
terrain. Some sites require adaptations such as de-icing systems for turbine blades. Turbine 
prices constitute the largest share of total capital expenditure, and often include shipping and 
installation costs.  
 
Compared to other power generating technologies, the operation and maintenance costs for wind 
power are low. The wind is provided without cost and in the absence of extreme weather or other 
unforeseen events, the need for maintenance is low. O&M costs include costs of labour, 
insurance, overhead, spare parts, land rent and balancing costs9 (NVE d, 2015). In order to 
account for likely increases in O&M cost over time, we assume an escalation rate of 1 per cent. 
  
The economic plant life of an onshore wind park is determined mainly by the technical lifetime 
of the wind turbine itself. Normally, the certified lifetime of an onshore wind turbine is set to 20 
years, which in turn decides the economic plant life of the wind farm. The actual economic plant 
life may vary across projects due to different turbine technologies and weather conditions. 
                                            
 
9 Balancing costs refer to costs occurring from the difference between planned (notified) and actual delivery of 
electricity volume. 
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We describe the capacity factor of a wind farm by defining the concept of full load hours:  
 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠  (ℎ) = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  (𝑀𝑊ℎ)𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  (𝑀𝑊)  
 
Full load hours is a measure of the annual electricity generation of a wind farm, represented by 
the theoretical number of hours (ℎ) that the wind power plant must operate at full power to 
achieve the same annual production. The capacity factor is then the number of full load hours ℎ  divided by the number of hours corresponding to a year of operation (𝐻 = 8760), expressed 
as a percentage. The concept of full load hours is a theoretical simplification of real production 
patterns. In reality, turbines will generate electricity at different wind speeds from around 3-4 
m/s, reaching full capacity at wind speeds around 11-13 m/s. Although the wind speed and wind 
patterns on the site is the main variable deciding the actual electricity output of a wind turbine, 
the actual production is influenced by additional factors such as the availability of the turbines 
and any production losses from external influences (Narbel, Lien, & Hansen, 2014). In 2014, 
average full load hours for Norwegian wind power plants in normal operation were 2,701 hours, 
corresponding to a capacity factor of approximately 31%. However, there were large 
geographical variations, and newer plants generally had higher capacity factors (NVE a, 2015). 
In our LCOE calculations for the wind power plants that receive electricity certificates (EC), we 
base the full load hour estimates on the expected annual production (MWh) assumed by the 
project owners. The assumptions and results are presented in Table 3 below: 
 
Name	   In	  operation	  
Installed	  capacity	  
(MW)	  eligible	  for	  EC	  
Expected	  generation	  	  
	  (MWh)	  eligible	  for	  EC	  
Full	  load	  hours	  
(h)	  
Capacity	  
factor	  (f)	  
Midtfjellet	  	   December	  1,	  2013	   57.5	   181,386	   3,154	   36.0	  %	  
Raggovidda	   September	  25,	  2014	   45.0	   189,000	   4,200	   47.9	  %	  
Åsen	  II	   March	  4,	  2012	   1.6	   4,200	   2,625	   29.9	  %	  
Table 3: Capacity factor assumptions 
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We notice that the expected output in relation to installed capacity, and thus the capacity factors 
vary considerably across the projects, and we recognize that the actual electricity generation over 
the plant life are likely to deviate from the expectations of the project owners, in particular due to 
the relatively short period of time that the plants have been in operation. In 2014, Midtfjellet 
wind farm had an actual electricity production corresponding to 2,884 full load hours, while 
Åsen II generated electricity corresponding to 2,500 full load hours in 2013 and 2,906 in 2014 
(NVE a, 2015). The Raggovidda wind farm stands out with high a capacity factor expectation. 
The wind farm has only been in operation since September 2014, and had a record capacity 
factor in its first months of operation10.  
 
The LCOE calculations are based on a discount rate of 7.7 per cent, which is suggested by 
Johnsen and Gjølberg (2009) as an appropriate cost of capital for renewable energy projects. In 
reality, the discount rate varies according to project specific parameters such as technology, 
ownership, financing and perceived risk. Table 4 summarizes the LCOE assumptions and results: 
 
Name	  
Discount	  
rate	  r	  	  
Plant	  life	  T	  
(years)	  
Escalation	  
rate	  e	  	  
Capital	  cost	  
(NOK/MW)	  
O&M	  costs	  
(NOK/kWh)	  
Capacity	  
factor	  (f)	  
LCOE	  
(NOK/MWh)	  
Midtfjellet	  	   7.7	  %	   20	  	   1	  %	   11,100	   0.060	   36.0	  %	   415.6	  
Raggovidda	   7.7	  %	   20	   1	  %	   13,800	   0.125	   47.9	  %	   462.9	  
Åsen	  II	   7.7	  %	   20	   1	  %	   10,000	   0.100	   29.9	  %	   487.9	  
Table 4: LCOE of onshore wind power plants eligible for electricity certificates in Norway  
 
The calculated LCOE of the onshore wind farms in Norway that currently receive electricity 
certificates for their production is in the range of 415.6-487.9 NOK/MWh. There are large 
uncertainties connected to these LCOE values since we do not have information on the actual 
costs of developing or operating the wind parks nor their project-specific cost of capital. 
                                            
 
10 In the period from October 1, 2014 to February 26, 2015, Raggovidda wind farm generated 112 MWh, 
corresponding to a capacity factor of 58.8%. The high capacity factor is attributed to a well-suited site for wind farm 
location due to high average wind speeds, low losses due to storms and a turbine technology well suited for the site. 
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We are interested in studying the energy cost of the Norwegian wind power projects in the 
pipeline in order to evaluate their potential to come online under the Swedish-Norwegian 
electricity certificate system. This implies that they need to be fully operational by the end of 
2020, and since it takes years to build a wind power plant we only included wind power projects 
that have been granted a license from NVE in our assessment11. In order to be granted a licence, 
the project must be deemed economically viable by NVE. The background reports that provide 
the basis for a positive licence ruling is made publicly available by NVE (NVE e, 2015). In the 
background reports, we find data on the project’s capital investment costs, O&M costs and the 
expected number of full load hours. For some of the projects, the report includes several 
alternatives for technology, installed capacity and number of turbines, with correspondingly 
different assessments of costs and full load hours. In such cases, we use the average costs and 
full load hours in the different alternatives. Of the 70 projects that have been granted a licence 
from NVE (status April 21, 2015), we have excluded projects that were granted a licence earlier 
than 2010 and projects that are smaller than 30 MW of installed capacity because small plants 
have a small potential to contribute to the quantitative target and several of them are test turbines 
with less representative costs, while plants with a licence older than 5 years are less likely to be 
realized and may have out-of-date cost evaluations.  
 
The NVE background reports suggest capital investment costs varying between 8.3 and 13.4 
million NOK/MW, O&M costs in the range of 0.10 and 0.17 NOK/kWh and the expected 
number of full load hours for the projects varies between 2,600 and 3,700. In Appendix B, the 
projects are presented together with their corresponding data on costs and full load hours as well 
as parameter assumptions on plant life, escalation rate and discount rate. The calculated LCOE 
varies from the least expensive project with an LCOE of 438 NOK/MWh to 617 NOK/MWh.  
 
                                            
 
11 From Figure 1, the projects with the status “Licence granted by NVE”, “Appeal on granted licence received by 
NVE”, “Appeal sent to OED” and “Final licence approved by OED” are included because these projects have all 
received a licence from NVE. 
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Due to the considerable variations and uncertainty in the LCOE parameters included in the 
calculations, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. A LCOE value for a reference project is 
calculated by using the average capital cost, O&M costs and capacity factor of the RES-E 
projects in the pipeline as input parameters. The LCOE parameters for the reference project is 
summarized in Table 512: 
 
	  
Discount	  
rate	  (r)	  
Plant	  life	  T	  
(years)	  
Escalation	  
rate	  	  
Capital	  cost	  
(NOK/MW)	  
O&M	  costs	  
(NOK/kWh)	  
Capacity	  
factor	  (f)	  
LCOE	  
(NOK/MWh)	  
Reference	  project	  	   7.7	  %	   20	  	   1	  %	   11,715	   0.135	   34	  %	   538.7	  
Table 5: LCOE of reference wind power project 
 
The reference project is not intended to provide a comprehensive profitability assessment of 
wind power projects in Norway. Rather, we use the reference project LCOE to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis, demonstrating how varying each of the input parameters by a given 
percentage (+/- 40%) gives rise to an absolute change in the output, i.e. the reference project 
LCOE. Since the parameters are changed one at the time, the sensitivity analysis does not 
capture possible interactions between the parameters. Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis 
provides valuable information on which input parameters that has a particularly large effect on 
the overall LCOE of a wind power project.  
                                            
 
12 A complete table of input parameters and LCOE assumptions is provided in Appendix B. 
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis (Figure 5) shows that the reference project’s LCOE vary significantly in 
absolute value with variations in the number of full load hours and the plant investment cost. The 
parameter values of plant life and discount rate are also very decisive for the LCOE value. The 
LCOE variation with respect to full load hours stresses the importance of efficient turbines and 
suitable wind resource sites. The LCOE sensitivity to plant investment cost, discount rate and 
plant life reflect the capital-intensiveness of wind power plants. Conversely, the LCOE is not 
very sensitive to changes in O&M costs or the escalation rate assumed for these costs.  
3.5 Technology risk  
Over time, the long-run marginal cost of power generating technologies has the potential to 
change due to cost reducing technological innovations, standardisation and economies of scale. 
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Figure 6: Development in representative turbine architecture (IEA Wind, 2012) 
Figure 6 depicts the development in hub height, rotor diameter and capacity of representative 
wind turbines over the past decades. In order to improve turbine performance, manufacturers 
could for example construct taller towers that would allow potential of stronger and less 
turbulent winds to be exploited. However, increasing turbine size does not necessarily improve 
its ability to extract energy from a given amount of available energy, which would depend on 
technological innovations in turbine design that improve the efficiency of wind turbines (IEA 
Wind, 2012). Norway follows a global trend in wind turbine development and can therefore be 
considered a price taker in the market for wind turbines. In addition to global demand for wind 
turbines, the price on input factors into turbine production such as steel, copper, aluminium 
influence turbine prices. 
 
Figure 7: Number of full load hours in 2014, by year of installation (NVE a, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
Figure 7 shows the actual number of full load hours13 of onshore wind power plants located in 
Norway in 2014, by year of installation (1991 to 2015). We rely on power production data for 
Norwegian wind power producers that were in normal operation in 2014 (NVE a, 2015). From 
graphical inspection, we observe that older wind power plants had a significantly lower number 
of full load hours than more recently installed plants. The positive trend is partly attributed to 
technological advancement and industry learning. Furthermore, the number of full load hours 
largely depends on geographical wind conditions, efficient operation and the chosen 
technology’s suitability to the site’s wind resources. The sensitivity analysis (Figure 5) 
demonstrated that the number of full load hour is an important determinant for the LCOE for 
wind power projects, thus a positive development in the number of full load hours has the 
potential to reduce future energy costs. When we considered the expected full load hours of wind 
power projects in the Norwegian RES-E project pipeline that have a licence from NVE, we 
found expected full load hours of these plants to be on average in the range of 2,600 to 3,700, 
which implies that potential new wind power plants are expected to have a similar or higher 
number of full load hours relative to wind parks in operation today. 
 
Figure 8: Expected development in LCOE of wind power (Bergen Energi, 2015) 
                                            
 
13 Calculated as the actual power production in 2014 divided by installed capacity. 3 wind power plants are excluded 
because they were not under normal operation throughout the year (Hundhammerfjellet, Raggovidda, Valsneset 
testsenter). 
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Figure 8 illustrates the expected development in LCOE of wind power projects globally. The 
expected decrease in overall generation costs should be attributed to decreasing turbine prices, 
higher capacity factors, more efficient wind turbines and industry learning. Expected decreasing 
costs in the wind power industry deriving from technological development and learning implies 
that there is a technology risk present to investors. Once an investment decision is made, the 
technology is in effect chosen. The technology risk translates into an opportunity cost to the 
investor since, once the investment decision is taken, he can no longer benefit from further cost-
reducing technological development. Agnolucci (2007) argues that new plants should demand a 
risk premium proportional to technological change, and the faster the trend, the higher the risk 
premium investors of new plants should demand. Technology risk should therefore be 
considered in the investment decision process, potentially influencing the timing of the 
investment. 
 
In the following, we consider the revenue side for RES-E projects. RES-E investors included in 
the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market are subject to two revenue flows; one from 
the sale of power and one from the sale of electricity certificates. First, we provide an overview 
of the Nordic power market, with a particular focus on the price formation and the price and 
financial risks in a liberalized electricity market. Next, the market mechanism and design of the 
common Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate system is described analytically as a basis for 
evaluating the risks to potential RES-E investors.  
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4 The Nordic electricity market 
The Nordic electricity market was originally regarded as a natural monopoly, and state regulators 
were concerned with balancing the need for security of supply, economic efficiency and 
environmental protection. The deregulation of the Nordic power market in the early 1990s 
rendered the system requirements unchanged, although they are now to be provided by the 
market mechanism. The liberalization process was gradual, and changes and improvements are 
continuously implemented to improve market integration and harmonization. The deregulation 
came as a response to the accumulated overcapacity and the goal was to increase the efficiency 
of capacity, improve cost efficiency of supply and introduce consumer choice.  
 
The properties of electricity affect supply and demand in a complex way, and is therefore 
worthwhile reviewing in order to understand how deregulation has introduced market 
uncertainty. Electricity is a flow commodity that cannot be stored14 and must therefore be 
consumed simultaneously as it is produced. Mismatches in electricity demand and generation 
must be covered instantly, resulting in short-term price spikes or troughs and periods of high 
volatility. Failing to balance supply and demand results in voltage and frequency fluctuations, 
which may damage equipment connected to the grid and compromise reliable supply of high 
quality electricity (i.e. correct voltage and frequency). Furthermore, transmission is restricted by 
Kirchhoff’s law, making the grid into a shared pool of electricity with multiple entry and exit 
points. This implies that electrons cannot be traced from producer to consumer, making the 
consumers inseparable.  
 
The Nordic electricity market is comprised of a financial wholesale market, a physical wholesale 
markets, a retail market and ancillary markets (real time). There is no market for electricity 
generation capacity, meaning that the price signal from the wholesale electricity market guides 
                                            
 
14 A large-scale technology that allows for practical and economical electricity storage does not exist to date, 
although potential energy can be stored in hydro reservoirs.  
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consumer and producer behaviour and investment decisions. Figure 9 illustrates when the 
different markets are relevant: 
 
Figure 9: Sub-markets in the Nordic power market 
4.1 The financial market    
The deregulation of the Nordic electricity market restructured the financial risks to the sector 
stakeholders. By holding decision makers financially rather than politically responsible, the 
entire supply chain from consumers, suppliers, generators, investors and financiers now have to 
incorporate financial risk factors into their decisions. Stakeholders should find it beneficial to use 
financial contracts for managing the price and volume risk associated with the physical 
electricity market prices. There is no physical settlement of financial contracts, although the 
financial market is closely connected to the wholesale power market. Stakeholders can hedge 
financial risk on a long-term basis through bilateral agreements, brokers or clearinghouses. 
Financial contracts are traded through the Nasdaq OMX Commodities exchange, which offers 
derivatives trade in Futures contracts, Deferred Settlement (DS) Future contracts, Options and 
Electricity Price Area Differentials (EPADs), using the Nordic system price as a reference. 
Contracts are currently traded up to six years in advance, covering quarterly, monthly, weekly 
and daily contracts. In 2014, the Nasdaq OMX had a turnover of 1,564 TWh in the Nordic 
market, approximately four times the physical turnover (Nasdaq OMX Group Inc., 2015). The 
Nordic electricity market is generally regarded as a transparent and efficient market with 
available mechanisms for the market participants to hedge their positions. Different market 
participants have different motives for trading in financial contracts. In order to obtain funding, 
investors may be required by financiers to secure the future cash flow through long-term 
contracts such as Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) or futures. Generators may trade in 
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financial contracts in order to hedge their physical production obligations and suppliers to secure 
prices for future purchases. The main element in the pricing of futures and forward contracts is 
thus the market participants’ collective expectations of the future system prices.  
4.2 The physical wholesale market    
In the physical wholesale market, electricity trade is arranged at the Nord Pool Spot day-ahead 
market and the Elbas intraday-market. In both markets, contracts for physical delivery of power 
are made between buyers and sellers. At Nord Pool Spot, power is traded in much the same ways 
as other commodity exchanges. However, since electricity is a flow commodity, the electrical 
energy is sold in categories according to the time of power delivery. Participants trading on Nord 
Pool Spot include power producers, the industrial sector, suppliers, brokers and dealers. Nord 
Pool Spot is organized into several bidding areas15 and on a daily basis, an auction is facilitated 
where buyers and sellers enter their bids and offers based on the energy they are willing to buy or 
sell at different price levels for each of the 24 hours in the coming day. The price steps chosen by 
the bidder must include the theoretical maximum and minimum price (EUR -500 and EUR 3000) 
and the bids can be single hour bids or block bids, which set an all or nothing condition for 
several consecutive hours. When the auction closes at 12 pm, the bids are aggregated into supply 
and demand curves for each of the next 12 to 36 hours for each of the bidding areas. Whenever 
there are transmission capacity constraints in the power grid, the market is divided into price 
areas to allow for prices that reflect supply and demand within each area. The interaction 
between supply and demand also determines a System price for each of the hours under the 
assumption that there are no bottlenecks in the transmission of power between regional bidding 
areas. An example of supply and demand curves and the corresponding system price is shown in 
Figure 10. 
                                            
 
15 Currently, there are five bidding areas in Norway, two in Denmark, four in Sweden, while Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia each constitute one bidding area. 
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Figure 10: Market cross determining the System price (Nord Pool Spot b, 2015) 
The Elbas intra-day market supplement the Elspot market in securing the necessary balance 
between supply and demand in the Nordic market. Here, sellers and buyers can trade electricity 
volumes close to real time and thus adjust for unforeseen imbalances due to for example 
operational failure of a nuclear plant. In 2014, the turnover at Nord Pool Elspot (day-ahead 
market) amounted to 361 TWh, while the total traded volumes on Elbas (intra-day market) was 
4.9 TWh (Nord Pool Spot d, 2015) 
 
Transportation of electricity and system operation is bundled in the Nordics and each country has 
a transmission system operator16 (TSO) responsible for maintaining transmission grid stability 
and security of supply. Grids are regarded as natural monopolies, corresponding to national, 
regional and local grids of different voltages. Sub-transmission operators are responsible for 
regional grids and local grids are operated by Distribution System Operators (DSOs), which role 
is to deliver power to the end-user. Since grid operators are natural monopolies in their 
respective areas, they operate under close inspection and various control mechanisms to ensure 
                                            
 
16 Nordic TSOs are Fingrid in Finland, Svenska Kraftnät in Sweden, Energinet.dk in Denmark and Statnett in 
Norway. 
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this public service remains cost efficient (NordREG, 2014). The Nordic power market is 
becoming increasingly interlinked due to interconnectors, transmission connections and 
regulatory cooperation. 
4.3 The Retail market  
Electricity suppliers first buy power directly from a producer or at Nord Pool Spot, before 
reselling it to end-users. Electricity consumers choose their preferred supplier and type of power 
contract17, resulting in competition between electricity suppliers within each country. Electricity 
price fluctuations are not necessarily reflected in the power price to consumers because, in the 
absence of real time metering, the price to consumers is not time differentiated, but rather based 
on averages. Moreover, the power price in the retail market differs from the wholesale electricity 
price by including grid payments, taxes and fees. Figure 11 shows the total electricity costs to 
end-users in Norway in 2013: 
 
Figure 11: Total electricity costs to end-consumers in Norway, 2013 (NordREG, 2014) 
                                            
 
17 The majority of Norwegian electricity consumers have spot contracts with an add-on fee on top of the Day-ahead 
spot market price, although fixed-price contracts and standard variable contracts (a mix between fixed-price and spot 
contracts) are also offered in Norway (NordREG, 2014).  
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4.4 Electricity generation  
The Nordic and Baltic region has an annual average electricity generation of around 420 TWh. 
Hydropower plays a dominant role in the Nordic power market, covering roughly half of the 
Nordic electricity consumption in years with normal precipitation and inflow. The Nordic 
countries have a diverse production mix. While hydropower accounts for nearly all electricity 
generation in Norway, Denmark use most thermal power although they have been switching to 
RES-E such as wind power and biofuels over the last decades. Sweden and Finland have a 
diverse mixture of different sources for electricity generation, including nuclear, hydro, thermal, 
biofuels and wind energy (Nord Pool Spot c, 2015). 
 
Figure 12: Nordic electricity generation 2011-2014 by source (Nord Pool Spot c, 2015) 
Figure 12 depicts the electricity generation in the Nordic region over the last four years by 
energy source. The category other thermal power includes both renewable energy sources such 
as biofuels and waste and non-renewable sources such as coal and natural gas. Remembering that 
production needs to match power consumption at all times, the clear seasonal pattern over the 
course of a year is explained by the seasonal variations in consumption. 
4.5 Price formation 
At Nord Pool Spot, sellers and buyers of electric power place bids on the amounts of electricity 
they are willing to sell or buy at chosen price levels, and power prices for the following day are 
calculated based on these bids (Elspot). Power producers base their price bids on their short run 
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marginal cost (SRMC), which is the relevant cost in the short run. The production cost varies 
across different producers and energy sources used for electricity production. The equilibrium 
price is set by the SRMC of the marginal producer needed to meet the electricity demand, who is 
generally a fuel intensive thermal technology with a high SRMC. Electricity generating 
technologies with lower fuel and operation costs are willing to dispatch their production at lower 
price levels. The supply side can be illustrated in a so-called merit order curve, which categorizes 
the typical available electricity generating technologies by their SRMC of electricity generation. 
We present an illustrative merit order curve for the Nordic power market in Figure 13, and 
explain the price formation in two different situations; one with normal demand and one with 
high demand and the corresponding prices 𝑝! and 𝑝!.  
 
Figure 13: Illustrative Nordic Merit order curve 
 
If we consider the situation with the normal demand, all generators receive the market price 𝑝! 
per unit of electricity sold. In the long run, the differences between the spot prices and their 
respective SRMCs, which is referred to as the infra marginal rent, should cover their average 
fixed cost. Situations can occur where demand is at maximum high and supply is insufficient to 
cover demand. The resulting supply constraint implies that the price (𝑝!) is set by demand since 
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there simply is not sufficient capacity available. The price 𝑝! incorporates a scarcity rent, which 
is the differential between (𝑝!) and the SRMC of the marginal producer. The scarcity rent is 
necessary in order to provide an incentive for capacity to be available in such occasions, and can 
be interpreted as a compensation for lying idle most days the year. The price (𝑝!) is capped by 
the market regulator at EUR 3000 per MWh at Nord Pool Spot. Since all generators receive the 
scarcity rent, the regulators pay close attention to the price formation to ensure that exploitation 
of market power does not occur.  
 
In the Nordics, power prices are highly correlated with weather conditions. Temperatures are 
important for electricity consumption, generally pushing prices up in the cold winter months in 
the Nordics. Typical daily demand variation has a peak in the morning and an extended peak in 
the afternoon, and the demand is higher during the day than at night due to the higher activity. 
The demand for electricity is highly price inelastic due to consumers’ lack of exposure to real 
time pricing. On the supply side, electricity generation from different energy sources have 
different effects on the power price. The relatively large share of hydropower in the Nordics has 
a smoothing effect on prices due to its ability to store energy and dispatch electricity for demand 
response or for balancing purposes. Inflow during summer when demand is low can be stored for 
winter when the demand normally increases. Wind power is non-dispatchable and has a 
negligible short-run marginal cost, which implies that it will produce electricity when the wind is 
blowing. Nuclear power plants serve as a base load18 in the Nordics and have a minor impact on 
prices despite its significant contribution to the total electricity generation, although unexpected 
failures to produce can result in price spikes. Combined heat and power (CHP) plants contribute 
to reduce the effect of demand fluctuations due to temperatures when their main product is heat, 
since increased heat production also increases power generation.  
                                            
 
18 Base load refers to electricity supply at the bottom of the merit order that covers the minimum level of demand in 
the system. 
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A fluctuating supply of electricity generation and an inelastic demand results in volatile spot 
prices. These price fluctuations have great impact on the various stakeholders in the market and 
generate a need for a marketplace where consumers, producers, suppliers, investors and traders 
can hedge or mitigate some of their financial risk.  
 
 
Figure 14: Nordic power prices, status May 9, 2015 (Nord Pool Spot d, 2015) (Nasdaq OMX, 2015) 
Figure 14 shows the development in the weekly average system price (nominal) from 2008 to 
2015 available from Nord Pool Spot (Nord Pool Spot a, 2015), weekly Futures (ENOW) and the 
monthly (ENOM), quarterly (ENOQ) and yearly (ENOY) DS Futures prices19 traded on the 
Nasdaq OMX (Nasdaq OMX, 2015). The figure shows that large price peaks have not occurred 
since winter 2011 and the unstable power prices from 2007 to 2011 seem to be replaced by a 
neutral or even declining price trend the last four years. The quarterly DS futures prices (ENOQ) 
depicts expectations of seasonal price variations, while the yearly DS Future prices (ENOY) 
indicate that prices are expected to remain at a relatively low level over the next five years.  
                                            
 
19 Nasdaq OMX contracts are only given in EUR/MWh and we have converted them into NOK/MWh using the 
current exchange rate 8.4 EUR/NOK (May 9, 2015).  
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4.6 Long-term Nordic power price drivers 
The dynamics of the Nordic electricity market rely on the market participants’ expectations 
about various factors that affect long-term power prices. Long-term power price forecasting must 
take into account that the generation mix could be altered. Ambitious targets to raise the share of 
RES-E capacity in the generation mix have led to the implementation of support schemes to 
encourage RES-E deployment that are not necessarily rooted in a market demand for new 
generation capacity. The basis for investments in new RES-E capacity in the Nordic power 
market is unlike that of most other European countries. While new RES-E capacity in the rest of 
Europe largely replace polluting coal- and gas-fired power plants, new RES-E generation 
capacity is generally added to the power mix in Norway and Sweden. Hence, investments in new 
RES-E capacity in the Nordics have a larger impact on the power balance in the long term. A 
potential Nordic power surplus would put a downward pressure on the Nordic power price. 
Moreover, the low SRMC of producing electricity of many RES-E technologies could alter the 
merit-order and thus affect the price formation. In Figure 15, we have added more wind 
generation capacity to the illustrative merit order curve in order to exemplify the merit-order 
effect of more wind generation capacity. In periods of high wind power generation, the supply 
curve is shifted out, size putting a downward pressure on wholesale power prices depending on 
the demand20. If the wind is blowing at peak power demand (Dday), generators at the steep part of 
the supply curve set the price and the wholesale power price could fall from 𝑝!"# to 𝑝′!"# with 
the additional wind generation. The impact on the power price of high wind power generation at 
night, when demand is lower (Dnight), would typically be less dramatic (𝑝!"#!! to 𝑝′!"#!!). 
                                            
 
20 The size of the price drop depends on the price elasticity of demand. 
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Figure 15: Merit order effect of more wind power generation 
Furthermore, periods with high wind power generation may result in transmission congestion in 
some areas. It is generally not considered economical or environmental friendly to limit wind 
power production, and a resulting excess supply in the pricing area would lead to lower prices in 
the congested sub-market. Expectations regarding planned investments in transmission capacity 
and interconnector capacity to bordering markets are therefore important for future power prices.  
 
The complexity of neighbouring fuel markets has a significant impact on the Nordic power price. 
A low price of CO2 emissions21 has made electricity generation from burning fossil fuels 
relatively cheaper. If the fuel and CO2 prices are not expected to pick up, it will contribute to a 
continued downward pressure on the power price since coal generators are often the marginal 
producer in the Nordic power system. Furthermore, expectations regarding electricity 
consumption affect the power demand forecasting. Factors that are likely to affect the electricity 
consumption in the Nordics are targets for energy efficiency and increased flexibility on the 
                                            
 
21 In 2014, the average EU-ETS CO2 price was EUR 5 per ton CO2 (NordREG, 2014). 
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consumer side with the implementation of smart metering which exposes consumers to real-time 
prices (NordREG, 2014).  
 
The Nordic electricity market is referred to as an energy-only market since the driver for 
investments in new generation capacity is the expected price of electric power sales. The ability 
of liberalized power markets to deliver investments in new capacity from various generation 
sources has been subject to studies (Owen, 2014), however the focus of this thesis is on 
investments in wind power production capacity and other RES-E technologies. An energy-only 
market is characterised by an increasing financial risk of not achieving full capital cost recovery, 
in particular for investors in generation technologies that exhibit high capital costs and low 
operating costs. (Owen, 2014). Grid parity for onshore wind power may be defined as the 
moment in time when wind turbines can generate electricity at an energy cost that is competitive 
to other technologies. Onshore wind power is expected to achieve lower costs in the future, and 
the concept of grid parity is thus relevant. When wind power reaches grid parity, it will be able to 
compete at the applicable wholesale prices, without subsidies. Grid parity of an emerging 
technology will not occur at a particular point in time, but rather differ between locations. We 
found that the LCOE of wind power projects in Norway that have a licence to build were in the 
range of 438-617 NOK/MWh. The current power price is approximately 240 NOK/MWh22, 
which implies that wind power cannot be assumed to have reached grid parity in Norway. With 
an overview of the cost structure of onshore wind power and the price mechanism in the Nordic 
electricity market, we will now consider the market mechanisms in the Swedish-Norwegian 
tradable electricity certificate market. 
 
                                            
 
22 Average system price Elspot January – April 2015. 
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5 The Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market 
A tradable electricity certificate market, also termed renewable portfolio standard or renewable 
obligations, is a market-based mechanism constructed with the purpose of stimulating 
investments in electricity generation from renewable energy sources without using direct 
governmental subsidies. With a political mandate to increase its renewables share, the 
Norwegian authorities decided to enter into a bilateral agreement with Sweden on the facilitation 
of a common electricity certificate market designed to incentivize private investments in new 
RES-E technologies.  
 
The market consists of buyers and sellers of so-called electricity certificates that are traded on an 
open market, separate from the wholesale electricity market. Electricity certificates are granted to 
producers of new renewable electricity. Renewable electricity includes electricity production 
from small-scale hydro, geothermal, wave, solar and wind energy, as well as biomass. One 
electricity certificate is issued for each MWh of new renewable electricity delivered to the grid. 
Each month, the renewable electricity producer receives a number of electricity certificates 
corresponding to its actual electricity generation. By selling its electricity certificates, the RES-E 
generator is provided with a source of revenue in addition to the power price charged from the 
production. The prospect of additional revenues should incentivize investments in new 
renewable electricity generation capacity. Producers that are entitled to receive electricity 
certificates can only do so for a maximum of 15 years, and no longer than ultimo 2035. Buyers 
of electricity certificates are suppliers who, on behalf of electricity consumers, are obliged to 
purchase a given amount of certificates in order to fulfil an imposed quota. The quota is given as 
a percentage of their total consumption that needs to be covered by new renewable electricity 
through the purchase of electricity certificates.  
 
The Swedish electricity certificate system came online May 1, 2003 with a quantitative mandate 
of adding 10 TWh of new renewable electricity generation to the power balance by 2010. The 
quantity mandate was later raised to 25 TWh by 2020. January 1, 2012 Norway and Sweden 
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agreed to establish a common market for electricity certificates with a joint target of adding 26.4 
TWh of new RES-E generation per year between 2012 and 2020. Each participating country 
shall finance half (13.2 TWh), regardless of where the new capacity is built. Figure 16 illustrates 
the expected contribution (in TWh) of new RES-E generation capacity that has entered the 
common electricity certificate market so far, including the direction towards 26.4 TWh by 2020. 
 
Figure 16: Expected new RES-E generation capacity 
Figure 17 below shows which RES-E plants that have been built in each country after 2012, by 
source, given as the expected electricity production (in TWh) as of January 1, 2015. 
 
Figure 17: Expected electricity generation from plants in operation per January 1, 2015 (NVE, Energimyndigheten, 2015) 
 
5.1 Support scheme design  
The market price for electricity certificates is determined by the interaction between supply and 
demand. Figure 18 depicts the supply and demand in a tradable electricity certificate market. The 
marginal cost (MC) curve of renewables represent the supply in the market, and PE is the market 
price of electricity. If no quota obligation were imposed on the end-consumers, meaning that 
there would be no demand for additional RES-E generation capacity, only renewable electricity 
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generation corresponding to A would be profitable at the electricity price level PE. 𝑄!"#$%& 
represents the politically determined objective of increasing renewable electricity generation. In 
order to supply electricity corresponding to the quantitative mandate 𝑄!"#$%&, renewable 
electricity producers would require higher revenue than that provided by the electricity price. 
The additional revenue required to introduce 𝑄!"#$%& renewable electricity generation would be 
the difference between the MC of the marginal plant needed to reach the target (MC*) and the 
electricity price PE. 
 
Figure 18: Tradable electricity certificate market equilibrium, based on (Bergek & Jacobsson, 2010) 
The Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market design is somewhat complex, and in the 
following the demand and supply of electricity certificates are described analytically.  
5.2 The electricity certificate demand 
The demand for electricity certificates is created by a quota requirement that is given in the 
Electricity Certificate Act (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2012). The quota obligation is imposed 
on electricity suppliers who, on behalf of the electricity consumers in Norway and Sweden, are 
required to cover a certain proportion (quota) of their electricity consumption by new RES-E 
through the purchase of electricity certificates. The imposed quota on their annual electricity 
sales or use determines the number of electricity certificates that must be purchased in order to 
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fulfil their quota obligation. For example, if the annual quota is 10 % and a supplier has used or 
sold 1,000 MWh of electricity in the corresponding year, he is required to purchase 100 
electricity certificates (100 MWh). Every year, no later than March 1st, the quota-obliged party 
submits details on the electricity sold and consumed in the previous year and they have until end 
of March to acquire the sufficient number of certificates to comply with the quota. Then, on 
April 1 each year the electricity certificates are redeemed, or “cancelled”. Failing to hold the 
number of certificates necessary to meet their quota obligation triggers a charge corresponding to 
a penalty price for each certificate they are short of. The penalty price is set to 150 per cent of the 
average certificate price in the previous year. The annual cancellation of electricity certificates 
implies that a continuous demand for electricity certificates is created since the quota-obliged 
actors must purchase new electricity certificates in the following period to meet the quota 
obligation.  
 
The annual quota obligation is given as a percentage of estimated electricity consumption. The 
so-called quota curves for each of the participating countries establish the annual percentage 
quota over the duration of the electricity certificate market (2003-2035). The quota curves for 
Norway and Sweden are presented in Figure 19, where the solid lines represent the applicable 
quotas in the Swedish and Norwegian Electricity Certificate Act and the stipulated curves are 
adjustments suggested by the regulators (Appendix C).  
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Figure 19: Quota curves (NVE c, 2014) (Energimyndigheten a, 2014)  
The figure 19 shows how the quota obligation23 is increased towards 2020 in order to increase 
demand for electricity certificates and thus stimulate RES-E investments. Since electricity 
certificates will not be issued after 2020 and RES-E production is only eligible for receiving 
electricity certificates for a period of 15 years, the quota obligation is gradually decreased in the 
period 2020-2035.  
 
The total demand for electricity certificates over the duration of the scheme is most easily 
understood if the yearly quota obligation is given as a number of cancelled electricity 
                                            
 
23 The annual quota is derived from the formula: 𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸  𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  (𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑑)  
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certificates. Figure 20 depicts the historic and projected number of electricity certificates 
cancellations each year in million electricity certificates (Appendix D).  
 
Figure 20: Total demand for electricity certificates  
The blue bars describe the number of electricity certificates estimated to be to be cancelled by 
Norway and Sweden within the common electricity certificate market over the period 2012-
2035. The Swedish RES-E producers that came into operation between 2003 and 2012 should, 
however, continue to receive electricity certificates for 15 years as they were offered in the first 
place. In addition, some RES-E producers that went into operation prior to 2012 in Norway 
receive electricity certificates for their production. The electricity generation from these plants is 
referred to as the country-specific transition periods. Each country’s transition period into the 
common market implies that not all the electricity certificates that are cancelled will count 
towards the quantitative target in the common electricity certificate market and is the main 
reason why the Norwegian and Swedish quota curves differ. The country-specific quota curves 
are the regulatory authorities main tool for achieving the politically determined quantitative 
target. During system reviews, scheduled every four years, the quota curves can be adjusted with 
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the sole purpose that the demand should stimulate investments corresponding to the quantitative 
mandate. The stipulated curves in Figure 19 represent the suggested adjustments to the quota 
curves from the on-going system review. The adjustments are suggested by the countries’ 
respective regulatory authorities and are highly likely to be implemented. The main reasons for 
the upward adjustments are the larger than expected electricity generation from older RES-E 
producers receiving certificates and lower electricity consumption than initially assumed (NVE 
c, 2014). The demand for electricity certificates is highly inelastic since it is based on a given 
percentage of electricity consumption, which in turn is deemed inelastic.  
5.3 The electricity certificate supply  
The supply of electricity certificates comes from RES-E producers whose production is eligible 
for electricity certificates. In order to be eligible for receiving certificates, power producers’ 
actual electricity production must satisfy the requirements of the Electricity Certificate Act and 
be approved by NVE or the Swedish Energy Agency. All or part of the power production may be 
eligible for receiving electricity certificates, and one electricity certificate corresponds to one 
MWh of electricity produced. The number of issued certificates in a year thus depends on how 
much new RES-E generation capacity that comes in to the market and the actual electricity 
generation of all RES-E plants that are eligible for electricity certificates. The number of issued 
certificates and thus the supply to the market is therefore hard to predict and can differ 
considerably from year to year. A RES-E generator with a negligible short-run marginal cost of 
producing electricity and certificates (e.g. wind) will produce what is feasible dependent on 
availability of the plant and weather conditions. The possibility of banking electricity certificates 
implies that producers can save certificates in years with excess supply or low prices and sell 
them in years when supply is low. Banking does, however, represent an opportunity cost since 
the capital is tied up and unavailable for other investments.  
 
All information on issued and cancelled electricity certificates in Norway and Sweden is 
registered in NECS and Cesar, which are the respective electricity certificate registers in Norway 
and Sweden. The two registers show the same information and all participants in the electricity 
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certificate market have an account in the registers and all transactions are recorded. The 
development of yearly issued electricity certificates and corresponding cancellation over the 
period 2003-2015 is presented in Figure 21 (status per March 31, 2015). 
 
Figure 21: Issued and cancelled electricity certificates 2003-2015 (Statnett NECS, 2015) 
Certificates that are issued but not cancelled become the reserve in the market. A certain reserve 
in the market is necessary to ensure market liquidity, since there are no possibilities for 
certificate borrowing (shorting) between periods. When Norway entered the market in 2012, the 
reserve was 8.78 million electricity certificates, which was accumulated between 2003 and 2012 
(NVE & Energimyndigheten, 2014). Following the 2015 cancellation of electricity certificates, 
the accumulated certificate surplus was 13.09 million electricity certificates (Statnett NECS, 
2015).  
5.4 The market price for electricity certificates 
Trade in the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market is exercised on an open market 
where certificates are traded freely across the countries’ border. The trade is carried out either 
through bilateral contracts, directly between electricity producers and suppliers or through 
brokered transactions. Examples of market places where electricity certificates are traded are 
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SKM (Svensk Kraftmäkling), ICAP and Cleanworld. We rely on SKM electricity certificate 
price data because SKM is the only marketplace with public price quotations and the SKM 
closing price determines the market price. 
 
Figure 22: Electricity certificate spot and forward prices 2005-2015 (SKM, 2015) 
In Figure 22, we present historic electricity certificate prices over the last 10 years, based on 
weekly averages of nominal spot prices and physically settled forward contracts. The certificate 
price development describes relatively low, decreasing prices until 2006, when prices started 
increasing sharply in the years 2007-2008. After a period of high certificate prices, a stepwise 
downward trend towards 2012 followed. When Norway joined the electricity certificate market, 
prices picked up in the first year before settling at a relatively low price level. From graphical 
inspection we observe that the prices are quite volatile and have varied considerably from the all-
time-high weekly average spot price of 376.0 SEK/MWh in 2008 to an all-time-low weekly 
average spot price of 136.8 SEK/MWh observed just recently (Week 13, 2015). The forward 
prices are presented at their historic nominal price level, such that in any year “F March +1” 
refers to the price of a contract with delivery in March the following year. “F March” refers to 
short-term contracts for the closest March with forward prices quoted only for the first 12 weeks 
of each year. As would be expected, forward contracts with longer maturity are priced higher 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
relative to the spot market price. We do, however, note that the forward prices follow the spot 
prices very closely, which may indicate that market participants find future price changes hard to 
predict or that the market mechanisms are difficult to interpret. In the following we will consider 
the long-term certificate price formation and short-term certificate market price influences.  
5.5 The long-run price formation 
Figure 23 depicts a graphical illustration of the expected long-run equilibrium price level in a 
tradable electricity certificate market24. 
 
Figure 23: Long-run electricity certificate price equilibrium, based on (Kildegaard, 2008) 
Previously established RES-E in the electricity certificate market will supply electricity 
according to their SRMC, which is their relevant cost for operational decisions. These power 
producers are willing to sell their electricity certificates at a price equal to the difference between 
their SRMC and the power price (𝑝!!"), defined as the short-run marginal cost curve for 
certificates (SRMCC). The quota target (𝑄!"#$%&) for new RES-E generation capacity is set at a 
level that is not satisfied by the existing capacity in the electricity certificate market. In order to 
reach Q, additional investments in new RES-E generation corresponding to I* is needed. In order 
                                            
 
24 Underlying assumptions of perfect competition in power and electricity certificates, a fixed electricity price Pe 
since the quota is small relative to the overall power market and constant returns to scale in the renewable 
technologies (Kildegaard, 2008). 
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to take an investment decision, potential RES-E investors need to have an expectation that the 
total expected income from the sale of power and electricity certificates exceeds their LRMC. 
The LRMC includes the SRMC, average per unit repayment of fixed costs and an average per 
unit risk premium (Lemming, 2003). By assuming a flat 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐶(𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) curve for new 
potential RES-E generation capacity, its intersection with the quota target 𝑄!"#$%&  should reflect 
the revenue generating long-run total price (𝑝!!") to the producers, consisting of the long-run 
electricity certificate price (𝑝!!") and the long-run power price (𝑝!!"). Since the LRMC of the new 
capacity needed to reach the quantitative target is not known, it is the market participants’ 
collective expectations of the LRMC of the marginal RES-E producer needed to fulfil the quota 
mandate that determines the certificate price. Between now and the long-run equilibrium 
depicted in Figure 23, the electricity certificate price is decided by where the existing short-run 
supply curve meets the demand for new RES-E (Kildegaard, 2008).  
 
Once new RES-E investments materialize, the relevant cost for short run operational decisions 
become the SRMC. The RES-E project pipeline in Swedish and Norwegian consist of mainly 
wind, small-scale hydro or other RES-E technologies with very low O&M costs and large 
average fixed costs (AFCs).  
 
Figure 24: New RES-E investments (Kildegaard, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
Since AFCs are not relevant for short run operational decision, these are subtracted from the 
LRMC of the potential new entrants, 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐶  (𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦), in Figure 24. The resulting low 𝑆𝑅𝑀𝐶  (𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) is likely to be lower than the assumed long-run electricity price (𝑝!!"), 
which implies that these generators will not consider the marginal cost of producing certificates 
in their short-run production decisions. Investments corresponding to 𝐼∗ shifts the SRMC curve 
out, and the certificate prices is continued to be set by the SRMCC of older plants and where it 
meets the demand for certificates (Kildegaard, 2008). 
 
5.6 Short-term electricity certificate price influences 
An electricity certificate system is a long-term policy instrument since it presupposes that the 
market participants consider the quota target achievement and long-term expected power- and 
electricity certificate prices rather than current market prices when they decide whether to invest 
in new RES-E generation capacity or not. Nevertheless, the short-term market price for 
certificates seems to be important for investment behaviour, thus we discuss factors that 
influence the short-term certificate price.  
 
According to Kildegaard (2008), the banking of certificates can level out certificate price 
fluctuations from certain types of symmetric risk. For example, fluctuations in electricity 
certificate supply due to annual weather and wind variations (volume risk) for a wind farm could 
be considered to average out over its lifetime and banking of certificates during high wind years, 
and vice versa, would therefore be rational (Kildegaard, 2008). The possibility of certificate 
banking may add to the accumulated surplus of electricity certificates (reserve) in the market, 
which is an important electricity certificate price determinant. The accumulated surplus of 
electricity certificates is determined by the balance between issued and cancelled certificates, 
which is influenced by banking since more certificates will be saved if the market participants 
expect higher future prices. The accumulated surplus of electricity certificates is presented in 
Figure 24 together with the yearly average electricity certificate market price.  
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Figure 25: Relation between yearly average certificate price and accumulated certificate surplus (SKM, 2015) (Statnett 
NECS, 2015) 
Figure 25 shows that the electricity certificate price increased substantially between 2006 and 
2008 when the accumulated electricity certificate surplus decreased. Conversely, the electricity 
certificate price has decreased in the last couple of years at the same time as the accumulated 
certificate surplus has increased. The electricity certificate reserve seems to be important for 
pricing, providing a negative relation between certificate prices and accumulated certificate 
surplus over time. A large accumulated electricity certificate surplus implies a low probability of 
short-term shortages. If the market believes that the certificate reserve in the market will retain 
since certificates are banked in anticipation of higher prices in the future, the certificate price will 
remain low. If, on the other hand, market participants expect certificate shortages, the certificate 
prices are likely to increase, encouraging investments in new RES-E generation capacity. The 
considerable surplus of electricity certificates that has accumulated in the Swedish-Norwegian 
market may provide the wrong price signal for the need for investment. The risk is that low 
prices cause potential investors to assume that other investors are already entering the market 
making them hesitant to enter themselves. If the downward pressure on certificate prices is 
caused by the accumulated certificate reserve in the market, the reserve should eventually be 
gradually reduced, providing higher prices to signal a need for more investments. However, even 
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though the prices are gradually raised, the market may be sluggish in delivering new investments 
due to long lead times, from the investors reaction on the higher price signal to the plant is fully 
operational. The trend in the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market so far has been 
that more investment decisions are taken in periods when the power prices and electricity 
certificate prices are high, and fewer investment decisions when prices are low, which is the 
situation today. Such cyclical investment phases may pose a risk to achieving the quantitative 
mandate by the end of 2020 if investment decisions are delayed for too long, rendering too little 
time for construction (NVE c, 2014). 
 
From the discussion on long term market price formation, it is reasonable to believe that the 
power market and electricity certificate market provide a relationship between the power price 
and the electricity certificate price; the prospect of higher power prices should make investors 
willing to invest at a lower future certificate price, and conversely lower power price forecasts 
will make investors demand a higher electricity certificate price. In the short term, such a relation 
between the power prices and electricity certificate prices does not seem to materialize.   
 
Figure 26: System price of power and electricity certificate spot price (SKM, 2015) (Nord Pool Spot a, 2015) 
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Figure 26 shows the nominal system price on the left axis and the nominal electricity certificate 
spot price on the right axis. Both price series are in NOK/MWh (one electricity certificate 
corresponds to one MWh) and both series show weekly average prices. In the last years, a 
situation with relatively low electricity certificate prices and low Nordic power prices has 
emerged, putting a “double” pressure on RES-E producers and a “double” disincentive for 
investments in new RES-E generation capacity. The electricity certificate spot price is very 
sensitive to new information to the market that may affect the balance between issued and 
cancelled certificates, such as announcements about investment decisions in new RES-E 
capacity, legislative changes or political signals. 
 
In conclusion, the main determinant for the electricity certificate price is the market participants’ 
expectations about the LRMC of the market clearing technology. The short-term electricity 
certificate price is decided by where the existing short-run supply of RES-E generation meets the 
quota obligation. However, short-term price influences such as the accumulated electricity 
certificate reserve in the market and new information largely dictates the market price for 
certificates. In order to understand what will drive the future electricity certificate price, the 
balance between issued and cancelled electricity certificates over the duration of the market must 
be estimated. While the number certificates to be cancelled each year is more or less given by the 
applicable quota curve, the number of issued certificates over the electricity certificate market 
duration is highly uncertain because it depends on how much new RES-E generation capacity 
that will enter the market by 2020.  
5.7 Static cost-effectiveness 
Static cost-effectiveness is an important criterion in the evaluation of support scheme adequacy 
and is commonly understood as reaching the target at minimum costs. The subject of cost-
effectiveness was a major driver in the design of a technology-neutral electricity certificate 
market in Norway and Sweden (Bergek & Jacobsson, 2010). We discuss the principle of cost-
effectiveness in light of the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market. 
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The expectation to the Swedish-Norwegian tradable electricity certificate market is that it will 
deliver new RES-E generation according to the quantitative target at the lowest total costs. In a 
static perspective, the long run marginal cost of generation for a given RES-E technology 
increases with installed capacity (or generation). The reason for this is that the sites with the 
most suitable renewable energy resource (e.g. wind) will be used first, and locating the 
technology at gradually less suitable sites becomes costlier. The long-run marginal cost curves 
also differ between the various RES-E technologies.  
 
 
Figure 27: a) Technology cost resource curves      b) Aggregated cost resource curve 
A cost resource curve represents the long run marginal cost of the additional realisable potential 
of new RES-E generation (TWh) to count towards the quantitative target (QTarget). Figure 27a 
depicts hypothetical long run marginal cost curves for different RES-E technologies and their 
corresponding potential in terms of expected electricity generation. Figure 27b is the result of 
adding parts of these RES-E technology cost curves into an aggregated cost resource curve. In 
order to reach the quantitative target, additional RES-E generation capacity corresponding to 
QTarget must be realised. The long-run marginal cost of the last unit of RES-E necessary to reach 
the target is LRMC*. At this level, only the cheaper projects from each RES-E technology, i.e. 
those projects with an overall energy cost lower than LRMC*, will be realized. From Figure 27a, 
these projects will contribute to QTarget with Q1, Q2 and Q3 respectively. Since the LRMC of the 
last unit from each technology (Q1, Q2 and Q3) needed to fulfil the quantitative target (QTarget) 
will equal LRMC*, the mechanism is referred to as the equimarginal principle and represents the 
least costly way to meet the target (Cerdá & del Río, 2014). 
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The implications of the cost-effectiveness principle is that the RES-E technologies with the 
lowest costs are deployed first and the projects with the most favourable sites or resources within 
each technology should be prioritized. Then, in order to meet the quantitative target, increasingly 
more expensive new RES-E projects is needed. In principle, this implies that in the early phases 
of a technology-neutral quota scheme there will be a greater deployment of low-cost 
technologies and locations. Cheaper technologies are generally those that are more mature and 
available, whereas less mature technologies are likely to be locked out of the market due to 
higher costs (e.g. offshore wind), depending on the availability of other RES-E projects and their 
costs.  
 
Figure 24: Issued certificates, by source (Statnett NECS, 2015) 
Figure 28 depicts the development in each RES-E technology’s share of the annual number of 
issued electricity certificates25 to RES-E producers in Norway and Sweden. In the first years of 
the electricity certificate scheme, the cheapest way to increase RES-E generation in Sweden was 
by increasing the power output in biomass CHP (Combined Heat and Power) plants or through 
fuel switching from fossil fuels to biofuels. As expected, it took time for investments in new 
plants to materialize, due to factors such as the licencing process and long lead-time. Over time, 
                                            
 
25 For 2015, we consider the number of electricity certificates issued so far this year (status per May 12, 2015). 
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wind power has become the major recipient of electricity certificates, reflecting its decreasing 
costs and a reduced availability of low-cost projects (Bergek & Jacobsson, 2010). 
5.8 Supply of new RES-E projects in Norway and Sweden  
The potential of the RES-E projects in the pipeline to come online by 2020 and their potential 
contribution towards the 26.4 TWh target can be described in a static cost resource curve. We 
construct an aggregated cost resource curve for the additional realisable potential of new RES-E 
in Norway and Sweden up to 2020. So far, 10.3 TWh26 of new RES-E generation capacity has 
come online in the common electricity certificate scheme. This implies that the additional RES-E 
generation capacity needed by 2020 in order to meet the quantitative target of 26.4 TWh is 16.1 
TWh. Some of the 16.1 TWh of new generation capacity scheduled to enter the electricity 
certificate system are likely to have already made an investment decision or they are currently 
under construction. However, no publicly available register of the status of the RES-E project 
pipeline following the concession process exists.  
 
As described in section 2, the RES-E project pipeline includes a considerable number of projects 
that have the potential to come online by 2020. However, not all of these potential projects are 
realisable under the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate scheme because the target would 
be overshot if more than 16.1 TWh new RES-E enter the electricity certificate market. In order to 
construct technology cost resource curves, we need an estimate of the additional realisable (by 
2020) generation capacity. For this, we use what was termed by NVE and the Swedish Energy 
Agency as the investable volume of RES-E projects by 2020. Furthermore, we assume LCOE 
ranges for the RES-E projects in the pipeline. For each RES-E technology, we apply relatively 
wide LCOE ranges that are meant to reflect representative energy costs for various potential 
projects in Norway and Sweden. The LCOE ranges are based on representative LCOE estimates 
as suggested by the regulatory authorities, supplemented with the author’s own assumptions and 
                                            
 
26 Status per January 1, 2015 (NVE, Energimyndigheten, 2015)  
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input from market actors (Energimyndigheten, 2014) (NVE d, 2015). For the purpose of 
constructing a cost resource curve, we use the LCOE intervals presented in Figure 29: 
 
Figure 25: Assumed LCOE ranges (NOK/MWh) 
Technology cost resource curves can now be constructed. Since we cannot know exactly which 
projects that will be realised, their expected generation or costs, we need to make some 
simplifying assumptions to construct the cost resource curves. The assumed LCOE cost ranges 
(Figure 29) are divided into stepwise cost-levels corresponding to intervals of 0.5 TWh of 
investable volume. Figure 30 depicts the cost resource curve for the additional (by 2020) 
realisable potential of Norwegian wind power projects and its assumed cost levels. Similar cost 
resource curves are constructed for the other RES-E technologies. 
 
Figure 30: Cost resource curve for additional realisable (by 2020) onshore wind power projects, Norway 
By aggregating the RES-E cost resource curves, we arrive at a complete cost resource curve for 
the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market, presented in Figure 31: 
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Figure 26: Static cost resource curve for additional potential generation capacity by 2020 
The static cost resource curve shows the long run marginal costs and generation potential of the 
various RES-E technologies that are expected to enter the electricity certificate market by 2020. 
Assuming that 16.1 TWh of new RES-E generation capacity come online and the quantitative 
target of 26.4 TWh is reached in 2020, we find that Norwegian hydro and Swedish bio are 
currently the cheapest builds, although quite a lot of wind power projects need to be realized, 
both in Norway and Sweden in order to reach the quantitative target. An additional 3.5 TWh of 
new wind power generation and 2 TWh of small-scale hydropower generation will be built in 
Norway. In Sweden, wind power is expected to be the largest contributor with 7.1 TWh. 
Moreover, Sweden is estimated to realise 2 TWh bio power and 0.5 TWh of hydropower. 
Sweden is experiencing an expansive growth in solar power projects. Although the new solar 
power generation is expected to contribute to the electricity certificate RES-E target, these 
projects have a relatively small generation potential and are therefore excluded.  
Our cost resource curve suggests that an additional 3.5 TWh of new wind power generation 
capacity could come online in Norway by 2020 under the common electricity certificate system. 
Although there are currently no wind power projects under construction in Norway, there is a 
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significant amount of projects in the process of taking an investment decision. To our 
knowledge, two relatively small wind power projects have announced a positive investment 
decision, namely ASKO  (50 GWh) and Roan (36 GWh). Several large wind power projects that 
are deemed profitable by NVE are expected to make a decision within the year. In mid-Norway, 
ten wind power projects are expected to reach investment decisions in the near future. If all these 
wind parks come online before 2020, they have the potential to add approximately 4.4 TWh of 
new RES-E generation, exceeding our estimate in the cost resource curve. Another large cluster 
of new wind power projects, located in Bjerkreim is considered as a possible addition to the new 
RES-E generation in Norway. The investors in the cluster are currently unable to reach 
investment decisions due to uncertainty regarding the grid connection. 
 
Furthermore, our cost resource curve indicates that a Swedish wind power project will be the 
market clearing technology required to fulfil the quota target, with an estimated LRMC of 
around 510 NOK/MWh. The expected, revenue-generating long-run electricity certificate price 
should then be determined as the difference between this LRMC and a medium to long-term 
power price. For a rudimentary long-term power price estimate, we rely on the average system 
price over the last 5 years of 312 NOK/MWh 27.  
                                            
 
27 Average system price 2029-2014 (Nord Pool Spot a, 2015). 
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Figure 32: LRMC clearing technology  
Under these assumptions, the expected revenue generating electricity certificate price should 
settle around 200 NOK/MWh. Still, the cost resource curve is static and it does not take into 
account the possibility of a decreasing long-run marginal cost over time due to technology 
learning.  
There are large uncertainties related to the cost resource curve that we have presented, both in 
terms of which RES-E technologies that will enter the electricity certificate market by 2020, their 
expected electricity generation potential and at what energy cost. Also, there is a risk that the 
quota target is not met or overshot.  
5.9 Evaluation of the cost-effectiveness criteria   
The effectiveness of a policy instrument rests on its ability to achieve a set target. The Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market is not designed to stimulate a rapid deployment of new 
RES-E capacity; rather it is designed to be effective in terms of meeting the politically planned 
quantitative target at the lowest total generation costs. 
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Figure 33: Distributional effects 
Even if the cost-effectiveness criteria ensure minimization of total generation costs, any 
distributional effects between producers and consumers are disregarded. In Figure 33, the area 
below the cost resource curve (LRMCAggregated) up to QTarget represents the total generation costs 
of reaching the quantitative target. The difference between the cost-minimizing compensation 
level LRMC* and the cost resource curve (LRMCAggregated) results in a producer surplus, 
illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 33. A uniform support level LRMC* for all projects 
entails that low-cost technologies receive an excessively high compensation and the cheapest 
RES-E projects included in the electricity certificate market may reap windfall profits (Haas, 
Resch, Panzer, Busch, Ragwitz, & Held, 2010). 
 
The electricity consumers in Norway and Sweden are the ones that will ultimately pay the cost of 
the certificate scheme through the quota obligation. Even though total generation costs are 
minimized, the total policy cost is not necessarily minimized since low cost technologies could 
have been sufficiently compensated at a lower support level than LRMC*. It follows that there is 
an unnecessary large transfer from consumers to producers (Cerdá & del Río, 2014).  
 
In a study of the distribution of costs and benefits across producers and consumers in the 
Swedish electricity certificate market, Bergek and Jacobsson (2010) find that the support scheme 
brought considerably higher costs to consumers than expected because of large rents to RES-E 
generators that were profitable before being granted extra payments and excessive rents to sub-
marginal plants, i.e. technologies that would be profitable at lower levels of support than that set 
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by the marginal producer (Bergek & Jacobsson, 2010). If there is a concern that the overall 
policy costs for consumers will become excessively high, policy makers may choose a 
technology-specific support schemes28 instead, which compensates high-cost technologies 
relatively more than low-cost technologies.  
The costs of the support scheme to electricity consumers are expected to increase towards 2020, 
before gradually declining, in line with the quota curve. The total cost to electricity consumers 
depends on the development in certificate prices. We have estimated the cost of the support 
scheme, to be paid by Norwegian electricity consumers over the period 2012-2035, to total a 
present value NOK 38.69 billion. The estimate is found by multiplying the expected number of 
cancelled certificates per year by a corresponding electricity certificate price and the details of 
the calculation can be found in Appendix E. This corresponds to NOK 2.58 billion per TWh of 
new RES-E generation capacity29 financed by Norway. Although the cost is highly uncertain due 
to the uncertainty in both future electricity certificate prices and the number of electricity 
certificates that will to be cancelled, it provides a rudimentary estimate of the total policy cost to 
be borne by the Norwegian electricity consumers. Swedish electricity consumers will pay more 
because they support more RES-E production that came online before 2012. 
Since two countries are jointly partaking in the scheme, the certificate market encompasses two 
different business environments. Differences in the regulatory conditions between Norway and 
Sweden have been used to explain why more RES-E facilities have materialized in Sweden than 
in Norway since 2012. Different labour costs, grid connection costs or wind conditions are 
factors that can hardly be attuned. However, more favourable tax depreciation rules and other 
technology- or country specific indirect subsidies on top of the electricity certificates for 
Swedish RES-E investors has been an important factor in distorting the location of generation 
capacity (THEMA Consulting Group, 2015). It is important to keep in mind that the bilateral 
                                            
 
28 This could be achieved through technology-banding within the quota or technology-specific Feed-in-Tariff. 
29 Based on 13.2 TWh of new RES-E generation. 
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agreement between Norway and Sweden is on the financing of RES-E investments, and not on 
where new RES-E projects are installed. Thus, we will argue that distortionary rules and 
regulations is not necessarily a risk factor in terms of reaching the quantitative mandate. Projects 
that would have been similarly profitable in Norway and Sweden under equal rules and 
regulation, may be built in the country with more favourable conditions. For the policy outcome, 
this implies that the best projects and locations are not necessarily utilized, and that the total cost 
of the support scheme becomes higher. By aligning the regulatory framework in the two 
countries, the gains from cost-efficiency would be assured since only then the best projects are 
realized. Moreover, there may be within-country differences in rules and regulations may 
between RES-E technologies. For example, a suggestions to align the Norwegian tax 
depreciation rules for wind power with Sweden is sent to parliamentary hearing, while small-
scale hydropower are not suggested to will not receive more favourable conditions. This 
asymmetry may lead to some small-scale hydropower projects, currently more profitable than 
wind power projects, being displaced by wind power projects under more favourable tax 
depreciation rules. In order to ensure cost-effectiveness, regulatory differences between the 
countries and between different RES-E technologies should be avoided. 
Employing a static cost-effectiveness criteria in policy design may result in a situation where 
promising RES-E technologies are not developed fully, resulting in a foregone cost reducing 
technology learning in the long term. This is refereed to as dynamic efficiency, and rests on the 
support scheme’s ability to generate a continuous incentive for technical improvements and cost 
reductions in existing RES-E technologies. Since the basic principle of the Swedish-Norwegian 
electricity certificate market rests on the competition between different RES-E technologies to 
ensure that the cheapest projects are built first, it can be reasoned that less mature, currently 
expensive technologies are not given sufficient incentive to technology improvements and 
dynamic efficiency is not guaranteed. Bergek and Jacobsson (2010) argue that the technology 
neutral support scheme is, in fact, deliberately designed to avoid creating markets for new RES-E 
technology inventions since mature, low-cost technologies are favoured.  
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To sum up, a technology-neutral tradable electricity certificate market is designed to be a cost-
effective policy, ensuring that a RES-E quantitative target is met the lowest total generation 
costs. Although the common Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market has shown 
relatively low effectiveness with respect to deployment of the less mature RES-E technologies, 
this is not an unintended consequence of the regulatory framework. Rather, it reflects the basic 
principle that investments should be made at a rate that is economically justified and not 
prematurely.  
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6 Risks and uncertainty in the electricity certificate market  
In the following, we discuss risks and uncertainty resulting from the design of the Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate system. We consider regulatory uncertainty, the risk of 
overinvestments due to lack of perfect information and the role of long-term contracts. 
6.1 Regulatory uncertainty 
Regulatory uncertainty may arise from the risk that existing support schemes are replaced or 
removed, or the uncertainty regarding changes to the existing regulatory framework. Following a 
turbulent European economy, several countries have been forced to reduce existing support to 
RES-E because the policies became too expensive.  Such retroactive policy changes may 
discredit the regulatory stability, and is a risk borne by RES-E investors and potentially the 
financiers (DNB, 2015). We consider the risk of significant retroactive changes to the current 
Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market to be very low. Nevertheless, the current policy 
will only support new RES-E generation that come online by 2020, and there is not yet any 
information available as to whether there will be a support scheme for RES-E investments after 
2020. Until it this is clear, the market participants can only interpret political signals. Policy 
uncertainty can be powerful in preventing and deferring investments, and expectations regarding 
future support for RES-E are likely affect investment behaviour.  
 
Political signalling and information related to changes in the regulatory framework are important 
drivers for the electricity certificate price. Hakvoort and Fagiani (2014) define regulatory risk as 
the risk that a change in the support scheme will exacerbate the certificate price risk, reflected in 
market price volatility. In the period from 2007 to 2013, they find evidence of increased 
certificate price volatility around periods that regulatory changes were made in the Swedish 
certificate market. They further suggest that the process leading up to the joint Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market led to a period of high volatility (Hakvoort & Fagiani, 
2014).  
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6.2 Risk of overinvestment and the 2020 deadline 
The investment phase in Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market expires by the end of 
2020 resulting in a deadline for receiving support in the form of electricity certificates. In section 
3, we described how wind energy is subject to cost reducing technological learning over time, 
which implies a value of waiting for wind power investors. The deadline for market participation 
reduces the value of waiting since constructing a wind park takes years and therefore gives rise 
to a concern, particularly in Norway, that those who start building close to 2020 will not reach 
the deadline. There are several likely risk factors that may arise due to the time pressure. In order 
to deliver the produced electricity to the consumer, a wind power plant is reliant on connection to 
a local, regional or central grid with available transmission capacity. The lack of grid capacity or 
grid connection possibilities is currently a bottleneck for several wind power projects in Norway 
(NVE c, 2014). Delays in power plant construction or grid expansion scheduled to be ready by 
2020, exposes the investor to the risk of not becoming eligible for electricity certificates. 
Furthermore, time pressure may increase investment costs due to constraints in the supply chain 
and project quality may be deteriorated due to hurried decisions. Additionally, there is the risk 
that some projects, which would have been profitable in the certificate market, may be 
abandoned due to the risk of not receiving electricity certificates (Lind & Rosenberg, 2014). 
Swedish RES-E investors can be eligible for receiving electricity certificates even if their 
production commences after 2020, however only up to 2035, and are therefore less exposed to 
the 2020 deadline risk. 
 
The certificate supply is determined by the electricity generation of the accumulated investments 
in new RES-E generation up to 2020, which implies that there is a risk of overinvestment or 
underinvestment relative to the target. In the investment phase, the market mechanism should 
correct a potential shortfall in investments through temporarily high certificate prices. If, at the 
end of 2020, there is insufficient investment, the flexibility in Sweden to issue certificates after 
2020 could reduce such a deficit. Industry-wide overinvestment, on the other hand, will result in 
prolonged certificate price spoilage, a depression of the certificate price until the physical excess 
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capacity is depreciated away or the quota target is expanded to absorb the slack. As described in 
section 5, certificate banking could practically eliminate volume risk or similar symmetric risks, 
however it cannot eliminate the asymmetric downside risk of price spoilage due to 
overinvestment. The reason for this is that overinvestment does not only relocate the timing of 
the cash flow, but reduces its present value (Kildegaard, 2008). 
 
Figure 34 below captures the risk of overinvestment in a graphical illustration: 
 
Figure 34: The risk of overinvestment, based on (Kildegaard, 2008) 
As described in the section 3 on costs, many RES-E projects, in particular wind power, have low 
variable costs of electricity generation, and consequently a negligible marginal cost of producing 
electricity certificates once built. Large average fixed costs (AFCs) from the irreversible 
investment is irrelevant in short-term operational decisions, meaning that a competitive power 
producer will not include AFCs in his offer price. In Figure 34, large AFCs are subtracted from 
the 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐶  (𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦), displaying the SRMC of new projects at a low level 
(𝑆𝑅𝑀𝐶(𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦)). If, by 2020, the optimal level of investments (𝐼∗) corresponding to the 
quota mandate (𝑄!"#$%&) enters the electricity certificate market, the total price to RES-E 
producers settles at 𝑃!∗. This price level is, however, very sensitive to the quantity of investments 
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in new RES-E generation capacity. Whereas the optimal level of new investment of 𝐼∗ results in 
a price level 𝑃!∗, an overinvestment would shift the 𝑆𝑅𝑀𝐶  (𝐴𝑙𝑙  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑) curve to 
the right resulting in a decrease to 𝑃! in the total price to all RES-E producers. Unless the quota 
obligation (demand) is increased to absorb the oversupply, RES-E producers will face low prices 
after 2020. A price level of 𝑃! would imply that the new RES-E producers with a cost level of 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐶  (𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) would suffer capital losses because they are unable to recover their 
average fixed costs (AFC). The risk of electricity certificate price spoilage due to industry-wide 
overinvestments is currently highly present in the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate 
market.  
6.3 The role of information 
A fundamental source of uncertainty in the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market is 
the lack of information regarding the electricity certificate supply and the status of the RES-E 
project in the pipeline. If investors lack perfect information about what production volumes are 
entering into the electricity certificate system or have taken an investment decision, they cannot 
know whether their own project will contribute to increase the electricity certificate reserve or 
whether their expected contribution is necessary to meet demand. Efficient market equilibrium 
requires that all potential investors have the same set of information. In section 2, we described 
how the concession process is fully transparent through publicly available registers. On the other 
hand, there is no notification requirement or similar register on projects that have reached an 
investment decision or are under construction. Since there is no mechanism to ensure that such 
information is available in perfect form, market actors cannot know how much new RES-E 
capacity will enter the electricity certificate market, which is essential information in order to 
predict the supply curve and the future certificate price level.  
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Figure 35: Imperfect information, based on (Agnolucci, 2007) and (Lemming, 2003) 
 
Figure 35 illustrates how the lack of perfect information about what production volumes are 
entering into the electricity certificate system could affect the investment level and long-run 
electricity certificate price. The SRMC curve is relevant for operational decisions while the 
LRMC curve is relevant for the investment decisions of potential new RES-E generation 
capacity. New investments will shift the SRMC curve of existing capacity to the right with the 
level of realized investments. Perfect information about the true LRMC curve that represents 
potential new entrants would result in an optimal level of investments according to the 
quantitative target and a long-run price level 𝑃!      !"#$%&'!" . If investors are not informed about all 
the production volume that will enter the market, they are likely to assume a LRMC curve that is 
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steeper30 than the true one at a corresponding expected long-run price level, 𝑃!      !!!"#$"%!"  that does 
not reflect the real market situation. Since the expected long-run price level is inflated, investors 
will collectively invest in too much production volumes and the quantitative target will be 
overshot (𝑄!"#$%&"' > 𝑄!"#$%&). The SRMC curve is shifted to the right with the level of 
Realized investments and with a given demand set by the quota, the price drops to 𝑃!      !"#$%&"'!" . 
Overinvestments resulting from the lack of information regarding the true supply curve affect 
prices negatively and contribute to a possible price collapse if the overinvestments are 
sufficiently high. If the true market situation is not fully reflected in the certificate price due to 
market participants’ lack of information, the expected price level will not signal correctly the 
need for higher or lower rate of investments in new generation capacity. The uncertainty 
regarding new production volumes that are entering into the electricity certificate system will 
become particularly important closer to 2020 because of the risk of industry-wide 
overinvestment and price spoilage. 
 
The lack of perfect information and market transparency could encourage the market actors to 
take on unproductive costs related to information gathering. Information asymmetry is present if 
some market participants have more information than others. A large power producer with a 
diversified portfolio of RES-E projects is likely to have more information about the RES-E 
project pipeline, whereas a small wind power producer would not necessarily engage in costly 
information gathering on the status of the complete RES-E project pipeline in both countries. 
Moreover, smaller market actors are likely to have limited information about electricity 
certificate prices and forecasts because they do not necessarily have the capacity, knowledge or 
resources to conduct such analyses themselves or to purchase it from external parties.  
 
                                            
 
30 By adding the LRMC curve for ”unknown” entrants, the true LRMC curve becomes flatter (assuming that the 
LRMC of the ”unknown” potential entrants are similar to the ”known” potential entrants). A similar mechanism is 
displayed in Figure 27 a and b. 
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Even if the 2020 target of adding 26.4 TWh new RES-E generation is fulfilled, the actual 
generation from to year to year and the total production over the whole period up to 2035 is 
uncertain. Volume variations in the production of electricity based on renewable energy sources 
are generally large and since the actual production determines the number of certificates 
obtained, both the generated electricity and the number of obtained certificates are stochastic 
variables. Volume fluctuations affect short-term generation and thus the SRMC supply curve. 
The quota obligation may also contribute to some volume risk. Since the demand for certificates 
is given as a share of the actual electricity consumption, any deviations from the expected 
electricity consumption assumed in the quota curve will result in too many or too few cancelled 
certificates. The currently large reserve of electricity certificates in the market makes the volume 
risk on the demand side less critical, although it may become more apparent if the certificate 
surplus diminishes.  
 
The market participants expectations to the balance between issued and cancelled electricity 
certificate in each year over the remaining duration of the electricity certificate market (2015-
2035) will determine their expectations to the certificate price. If the market actors believe that 
there will be a future shortage of certificates, prices will stay positive. However, with a 
prolonged certificate surplus and insufficient demand to absorb the issued certificates in each 
year and the certificate stock over the entire balancing period, the certificate price is likely to 
collapse. Worst-case scenario, established RES-E producers are not able to recover their capital 
costs, and bankruptcy may prevail. The regulators may choose to intervene by adjusting the 
quota curve upwards, introduce a price floor or back-load certificates,31 which will be discussed 
in section 8. 
 
                                            
 
31 Back-loading refers to a market intervention where electricity certificates are temporarily withdrawn in order to 
keep the price at a higher level. 
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6.4 Price risk and the role of long-term contracts 
In this section, we elaborate on how the uncertainty in future certificate prices and short-term 
price volatility may affect different types of RES-E investors and the possibilities for price 
hedging in the electricity certificate market. In general, a liquid forward market for hedging 
purposes is considered essential for attracting new investors to a commodity market. A solid 
hedging strategy should manage the market risk and make it easier to obtain external financing, 
while at the same time create acceptable revenue stability for investors without taking away any 
upward potential. We identify some issues that obscure the liquidity of the Swedish-Norwegian 
electricity certificate market, namely the low turnover rate and trading volumes, high volatility 
and lack of transparency. First, we discuss theory on the role of long-term contracting in a 
technology-neutral tradable electricity certificate market, before we consider the implications for 
RES-E investors the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate system.  
 
In the literature, long-term certificate contracts have been identified as important for the success 
of tradable certificate markets (Agnolucci, 2007) (Kildegaard, 2008). Financiers cannot take on 
significant risks and if they are concerned with the extent of the price and volume risks they will 
require long-term contracts to secure stable cash flows. If there are low volumes of available 
long-term contracts, this poses a risk of not obtaining financing if the investor is unable to meet 
the requirements of the financier.  
Kildegaard (2008) argues that RES-E investors (and financiers) will require a substantial risk 
premium (𝜌) due to the asymmetric downside risk of overinvestment and subsequent price 
spoilage. The risk premium in consideration results from a lack of coordination among market 
agents, and not the characteristics of the technology or environment. Kildegaard (2008) argues 
that the risk of overinvestment could be eliminated through a contracting mechanism that 
coordinates the market agents since the obliged party will not enter into contracts for more 
certificates than what is necessary to fulfil the quota (Kildegaard, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
Figure 36: The effect of coordination risk, based on (Kildegaard, 2008) 
In figure 36, the coordination risk 𝜌 results in a higher cost of financing that shifts the LRMC of 
potential new capacity upwards. If the price does not cover the LRMC and 𝜌, capital-intensive 
technologies such as wind will not be established if they must rely on spot sale of certificates. In 
order for long-term contract to develop, the welfare of both eligible and obliged parties must be 
maintained or improved. Investor will accept long-term contracts as long as the total price is 
equal to 𝑃! or higher. Certificate-obliged consumers can reduce their certificate costs by entering 
long-term contracts at 𝑃!  (𝜌) or lower, which they will do if their cost reduction is valued higher 
than the option value of buying certificates from the next generation technology more cheaply in 
the spot market. This option is forfeit once the consumer enters into a long-term contract with a 
producer. By taking into consideration additional risk factors such as regulatory uncertainty, it 
seems likely that the risk premium is considerably larger than the option value of buying 
certificates at the spot market from the next generation technology. If this is the case, then 
equilibrium occurs where it is the best interest of consumers to eliminate the coordination risk 𝜌 
through long-term contracting for a price level at 𝑃! (Kildegaard, 2008).  
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Figure 37: Long-term contracts in a technology neutral certificate market, based on (Kildegaard, 2008) 
With a similar reasoning, it can be shown that a technology-neutral certificate market where both 
low fixed cost technologies (e.g. biofuels) and capital-intensive technologies (e.g. wind) are 
eligible for certificates may result in a lower volume of long-term contracts being offered. In 
Figure 37, the inclusion of low fixed cost technologies gives a more elastic supply curve 𝑆𝑅𝑀𝐶(𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠). If we consider the case where there are no investments in high fixed cost 
technologies such as wind initially, the total price will be 𝑃! 𝑁𝑜  𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 . New wind capacity is 
not established if the investor must rely on spot sale of certificates since 𝑃! 𝑁𝑜  𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑  is not 
sufficient to cover the 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐶 and 𝜌. The criterion for consumers to offer long-term contracts 
becomes stricter because the option value of buying certificates from future technologies on the 
spot market must now be valued less than 𝑃! 𝑁𝑜  𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 − 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐶 𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 , which 
is smaller than the coordination risk premium (𝜌). Since the condition for consumers to be 
willing to offer long-term contracts becomes stricter under a technology-neutral electricity 
certificate scheme where low fixed cost technologies are present, it is less likely that long-term 
contracts will be offered (Kildegaard, 2008). With less available long-term contracts, the RES-E 
composition could potentially be shifted away from capital-intensive technologies that require 
long-term contracts in order to secure financing. It should, however, be noted that an 
introduction of long-term contracting is not unproblematic. Short-term certificate spot market 
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liquidity would suffer, and long-term competition between successive technology vintages may 
be lost. 
6.5 Trading in the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market  
In the early phases, brokerage and advisory services facilitated trading in electricity certificates, 
generally in non-standardised contracts. As the certificate volumes increased, trading through 
energy brokers, specialising in the RES-S market, offering standardised or semi-standardised 
products has emerged. Currently, electricity certificate trading occurs through bilateral 
agreements, directly between producers and the quota-obliged buyers or through brokered 
transactions. The Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market has yet to see significant 
trading volumes on transparent exchanges such as Nasdaq OMX.  
 
The electricity certificate registers NECS and Cesar reported total transaction volume of 
47,705,332 electricity certificates (corresponding to 47.7 TWh) in the period 1 April 2013 to 31 
March 2014 (Statnett NECS, 2015). About half of the electricity certificates in the Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market are traded through bilateral contracts or directly between 
generators and those having quota obligation (Hakvoort & Fagiani, 2014). Both volume and 
price on all transactions are registered in NCES and Cesar. However, since there can be a lag 
between the contract is entered and physical transaction, the prices in the registers does not 
provide an accurate market spot price. Rather, the result of brokered transactions on the major 
brokered trading places is the commonly recognised market spot price. In the period April 1 
2013 to March 31 2014, SKM, ICAP and Clean World, reported that approximately 29 TWh 
were traded through brokered transactions32 (NVE & Energimyndigheten, 2014). Figure 38 
displays the volume of electricity certificates traded in different types of contracts.  
                                            
 
32 Publicly available records on traded volumes through brokered transactions are not provided by neither of the 
brokers SKM, ICAP or Clean World.  
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Figure 38: Certificate trading volumes by type of contract (NVE & Energimyndigheten, 2014) 
Over 60 per cent of total traded volumes at brokerages were spot contracts and the closest 
forward contract, i.e. for the following March. The low volumes of trade in the forward contracts 
and their limited maturity (maximum 5 years) limit the possibility for investors to secure future 
cash flow through semi-standardised33 contracts. In order to fulfil the financiers’ requirements to 
a secure cash flow, investors may therefore seek actors in the market who would be willing to 
sign long-term contracts. These could be anyone with a quota obligation, although power-
intensive industry and large electricity suppliers with a quota obligation are most likely to be 
interested in long-term contracts for electricity certificates. The terms of such contracts are 
normally not publicly available and remain hidden from other market participants. For potential 
investors, long-term contracts can be critical in order to make an investment decision or obtain 
financing. If it is difficult to find market actors that are willing to sign long-term contracts, the 
market uncertainty increases. Hedging fees are likely to vary depending on the type of trade. 
Midttun & Gundersen (2003) suggest that hedging fees decrease as transactions become more 
transparent and contracts are standardised. Since a large share of the volume in electricity 
                                            
 
33 Semi-standardised contracts are traded over the counter (OTC) at brokerages such as SKM, where trade entries are 
usually multiples of 5,000 certificates. 
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certificates are traded in non-standardised contracts and only semi-standardised brokered trading, 
the hedging fees are likely to be relatively high (Midttun & Gundersen, 2003). 
 
The precarious design of the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market may entail large 
risks and uncertainty to RES-E investors who rely on the electricity certificate price, together 
with the power price, to cover their long run marginal cost. The motivation for the following is to 
discuss how the risk and uncertainty may influence RES-E investors under the Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market and whether it can potentially affect the policy outcome. 
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7 The effect of risk and uncertainty 
As we saw in section 3, the LCOE is sensitive to variations in the cost of capital, in particularly 
for high capital cost technologies such as wind power. In the following, we present the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and a brief literature review to provide a basis for a discussion 
on the potential effects of the risk related to wind power investments under the Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate system on the cost of capital of projects, and whether risk 
mitigation has the potential to lower the overall costs of RES-E deployment.  
7.1 The cost of capital 
The cost of capital reflects both the total required rate of return for investors and the cost of debt, 
and takes into account that projects are financed by both equity and debt. To invest in projects 
with higher risks investors will require a higher rate of return. In a similar fashion, financiers will 
charge a higher interest rate on loans issued to more risky investments. We present the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC), which includes the total required return on a project by 
combining the requirements of the equity (owner) and debt (lender) providers. The cost of equity 
and the interest rate on debt are weighted by the equity share and debt share of the total 
investment, respectively. It is generally accepted that risk levels can be reflected in the cost of 
capital required for funding RES-E projects. One reason for this is that higher project risks, 
particularly in the form of uncertain future cash flows, limits the amount of debt that can be 
raised. 
 
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) summarizes the required return on debt and equity 
by the respective weight, as shown in the formula: 
 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷 ∙ 𝑟! + 𝐷𝐸 + 𝐷 ∙ 𝑟! ∙ (1− 𝑠) 
 
Where 𝑟!   is the required return of equity and 𝑟!   is the cost of debt. 𝐸 is equity and 𝐷 is debt and (1− 𝑠) is the effect of corporate tax. In general, interest on debt paid to a lender is tax deductible 
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and the tax effect reduces the overall WACC. This is one of the reasons why debt has a lower 
required rate of return than equity. Moreover, senior debt is placed high in the capital hierarchy 
resulting in a prioritized stake in the company’s revenue stream. In the case of liquidation, the senior 
debt provider will have the first claim on company assets. An increased level of debt results in higher 
risk for the owner, keeping the total company risk constant. Different projects or firms may have 
different combinations of debt and equity. Since equity is generally more expensive than debt, the 
debt-to-equity ratio can have a significant impact on the average cost of capital of a project (Johnsen 
& Gjølberg, 2009). 
 
For an investor, the required rate of return may be defined as the expected return that the capital 
market offers on a similarly risky investment. A renowned method for estimating appropriate 
level of required return on equity is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM): 
 𝐸 𝑟! = 𝑟! + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐸 𝑟! − 𝑟!    
 
Where 𝐸 𝑟!  is the expected return, 𝑟! is the risk free interest rate, 𝛽 is systematic risk and 𝐸 𝑟! − 𝑟!  is the expected market premium (above the risk free 𝑟!). 
 
The risk-free rate 𝑟! simply reflects the time value of money. The second term of the formula 
reflects the additional expected return that the investor requires in order to take on risk. The 
market premium is the expected excess return above the risk free rate on a well-diversified 
market portfolio. Assuming that investors hold relatively well-diversified portfolios, they will 
only require compensation for systematic, non-diversifiable risk. The β factor measures the non-
diversifiable risk in comparison to the market portfolio risk, and gives an indication of the 
investment risk relative to the market as a whole (Johnsen & Gjølberg, 2009).  
 
Under the CAPM, investors are only compensated for systematic risk, while non-systematic 
(idiosyncratic) risk is assumed removed completely through diversification. Although the CAPM 
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is a commonly used method for estimating the cost of equity by firms or investors, it may not 
necessarily capture their actual required return since it is not necessarily the case that investors 
have fully diversified portfolios. Moreover, the CAPM is normally based on the achieved return 
of larger publicly traded companies, hence a liquid asset. If the CAPM is used for estimating the 
required rate of return for small or private firms, it may be desirable to add a liquidity premium, 
representing the owner’s risk related to being locked into the investment.   
7.2 Literature review 
The cost of capital of a project is generally considered confidential and sensitive information to 
competition. The complexity of ownership structures, varying level of debt, different types of 
debt and investors’ risk preferences suggests that the WACC may vary across projects. We 
discuss a few studies that consider appropriate rates of return on investments in RES-E 
technologies. 
 
In a study of Norwegian investments in renewable energy, Johnsen and Gjølberg (2009) suggest 
a cost of capital of 7.7 per cent after tax34, assuming an equity share of 60 per cent. The 
calculation is based on a version of the CAPM, adjusted for weighted average cost of capital. 
The risk free interest rate and the market premium are both set at 5 per cent and the beta value is 
0.7. The study is based on representative listed companies that are used as proxies to develop 
beta values for various RES-E technologies. The study suggests beta values of 0.6 for biomass, 
0.7 for hydropower and 0.8 for wind power investments. Moreover, a liquidity premium would 
be appropriate to add since most owners of wind energy are not listed companies. 
 
Based on data from Europe, the U.S. and Canada, Dunlop (2006) construct a benchmark for the 
return on equity in wind energy investments of 12 per cent and assumes that the rate will drop to 
9 per cent with time. The benchmark is constructed by adding a risk free interest rate of 3 per 
                                            
 
34 Assuming a tax level of 28 per cent. Without tax the cost of capital is 10.7 per cent 
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cent, an equity risk premium of 4 per cent, fund management expenses of 2 per cent and an 
illiquidity premium for non-listed investments of 3 per cent. Furthermore, Dunlop (2006) suggest 
a plus or minus 3 per cent adjustment depending on regulatory risk. Germany is mentioned as an 
example of low risk due to the Feed-in-Tariff system guaranteeing a fixed price level, while the 
U.K. is identified with the highest risk due to its market-based Renewable Obligation Certificate 
system, which has some similarities with the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market. 
Based on the findings of Dunlop (2006) we argue that the regulatory uncertainty arising from a 
tradable certificate system is likely to increase the risk premium, although the relation between 
regulatory risk and cost of capital requires further study. 
 
It is not the goal of this thesis develop estimates of an appropriate cost of capital for investments 
in new RES-E under the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificates scheme. However, we aim to 
identify whether the different features of the current support scheme are likely to influence the 
cost of capital using economic reasoning.  
7.3 The effect of risk and uncertainty in the Swedish-Norwegian electricity 
certificate system 
The thesis has identified various risks and uncertainties faced by investors in new RES-E 
capacity under the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate system. In the following, we 
discuss whether the risk factors could have an impact on investment decision and the cost of 
capital. While some factors are outside the control of a particular RES-E project developer, other 
factors may be technology-related and project specific. 
 
Even with a risk premium that is, in principle, a question of the systematic risk (i.e. the risk that 
cannot be diversified through a broad portfolio), some more fundamental questions relating to 
the stability of the regulatory and political regime may be relevant in a risk premium assessment. 
In a politically imposed market such as the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate scheme, 
investors are exposed to risk of policy changes. Regulatory risk contributes to higher risk 
premium if the expected changes to the policy are asymmetric, meaning that there is a greater 
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likelihood that the changes will weaken the future cash flow than increase it. In the section 8, we 
evaluate how and whether the regulators can potentially reduce the uncertainty in the regulatory 
framework. 
 
In section 2 we discussed how the technology risk results in a value of waiting for investors. For 
an investor it may be beneficial to delay an investment decision as long as possible to ensure 
access to state of the art technology at lower costs. However, since new RES-E investments 
under the electricity certificate support scheme needs to be operational by the end of 2020, the 
value of waiting is reduced due to the risk of not receiving electricity certificates. It can be 
argued that investors should demand a risk premium due to technological progress, since once 
the plant is built it may risk being undercut by newer versions of the same technology that has 
lower costs. If market participants expect that the market clearing technology will have a lower 
total cost of electricity generation, the long-term expectations for the electricity certificate price 
will fall. 
 
A solid understanding of the price and volume risk in both the power market and the electricity 
certificate market is an important foundation for investment decision. Due to the considerable 
cash flow uncertainty, investors and financiers will surely require a risk premium. For a potential 
investor, this risk must be reduced to acceptable levels in order to reach an investment decision. 
Marginal investors relying on the sale of electricity certificates to cover their fixed costs are 
likely to require a higher rate of return, resulting in a higher cost of capital to compensate for the 
risk. Different investor types will have different risk appetite and ability to manage risk. The lack 
of information about and uncertainty regarding the future supply and demand for electricity 
certificates introduces an asymmetric downside risk of industry-wide overinvestments, which 
poses a threat of certificate price collapse in the period after 2020. Furthermore, if financiers are 
concerned about project’s price and volume risk, they may charge higher interest rates, adding to 
the cost of capital. The limited liquidity in the markets for electricity certificate forward contracts 
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and limited information about the availability of long-term contracts poses a challenge to some 
projects that are in the process of securing financing.  
 
In Norway, several of the wind power projects in the pipeline require extensions of the central or 
regional grid in order to be realized. Possible delays in planned grid expansions therefore pose a 
risk to the deployment of new generation capacity. For a particular investor, grid connection is a 
prerequisite for an investment decision rather than an investment driver, since it cannot be 
realized without grid connection. Thus, it is not likely to have any effect on the cost of capital. 
However, it could imply that economically viable projects under the certificate scheme are 
delayed or stranded. 
 
Through the discussion on various risk factors faced by investors in new RES-E capacity under 
the Swedish-Norwegian electricity we find indications that a significant risk premium may be 
present. While some risk factors originate from the design of the support scheme, others can be 
traced back to the characteristics of the technology. If the perceived risk to capital cost recovery 
is significantly large, investors may be hesitant to enter the market. If the risk premium raises the 
cost of capital and thus the LRMC of potential projects, the policy outcome could be altered. In 
the following, we describe how a potentially large risk premium can affect the policy outcome in 
terms of cost-effectiveness and welfare allocation. 
 
The technology-neutral Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate scheme was based on the cost-
effectiveness principle to ensure that the quantitative target for RES-E deployment is reached at 
the lowest total generation costs. A risk premium arising from the uncertainty regarding capital 
cost recovery would be included in the LRMC calculation of the potential investor. In a simple 
cost resource curve, it can be shown that a risk premium could add to the total generation costs 
of potential investors and thus the costs to electricity consumers.   
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Figure 39: Risk premium with high and low capital cost, based on (Haas, Resch, Panzer, Busch, Ragwitz, & Held, 2010) 
Moreover, it may be argued that the risk premium raises the cost of capital more for high capital 
cost technologies such as wind power, as displayed in figure 39 (Haas, Resch, Panzer, Busch, 
Ragwitz, & Held, 2010). Johnsen and Gjølberg (2009) found indications that the systematic risk, 
represented by the beta, varies with technology and that there is a higher risk associated with 
wind energy investments compared to biomass or hydropower investments. Assuming that wind 
power will be the market clearing technology, a particularly high cost of capital for potential 
wind power investments results in a higher overall policy cost since new investments require a 
higher long-run compensation level. At a higher total price paid to all RES-E producers, the 
producer surplus increases. Since electricity consumers in Norway and Sweden will ultimately 
pay for the support scheme, a larger producer surplus implies large transfers from consumers to 
producers.  
 
In the more sophisticated graphical illustration (Figure 40), it can be shown that a high risk 
premium (𝜌) shifts in LRMC of new capacity upward. The figure illustrates how the introduction 
of a risk premium would lead to lower investment in new RES-E capacity (𝐼∗(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) than the 
optimal quantity (𝐼∗(𝑁𝑜  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) and higher long run certificate price (𝑃!(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘).  
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Figure 40: Welfare effects of risk premium, Kildegaard (2008) 
The welfare effects of a higher risk premium could be read from the graphical illustration. The 
area ADEH indicates a loss to consumer surplus. For existing producers, there is a gain in 
surplus corresponding to the area ACGH because all RES-E producers in certificate market are 
paid the higher certificate price 𝑃!(𝜌). The area CDEF represents the expected gain to new 
producers, due to the increase in certificate price. In total, the area CDEG is the net welfare loss 
due to a high risk-premium. Kildegaard (2008) argues that this additional transfer from 
consumers to producers cannot be regarded as a welfare gain because it is due to a socially 
unproductive risk that could have been eliminated if the market participants were informed about 
supply and demand or could coordinate through long-term contracts such that investors in new 
capacity were guaranteed a certificate price for a period. (Kildegaard, 2008).  
 
Through a revision of the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate marked, we find indications 
of a high degree of uncertainty in the market. Risk factors may potentially affect investments in 
new RES-E generation capacity, lead to high cost of capital and increase the total policy cost. 
Possible gains of reducing the risk premium related to the support scheme design should be 
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relevant for regulators. In the next chapter, we discuss whether the regulators could make 
alterations to the electricity certificate market design in order to reduce the negative effects of 
risk and uncertainty. In particular, we consider the coordination risk due to lack of information, 
risk related to the 2020 deadline and how the regulators can play a role in reducing demand side 
uncertainty. 
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8 Reducing risk and uncertainty in the Swedish-Norwegian 
electricity certificate market  
The consequences of risk and uncertainty for potential investors in new RES-E generation 
capacity under the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market discussed in the previous 
chapter stresses the possible benefits of reducing unnecessary uncertainty. We discuss how the 
regulators may play a role in reducing risk through possible policy design alterations. 
8.1 Price floor 
Low electricity certificate prices may lead to a severe slowdown in investment decisions. Due to 
the short time frame of the market, delays in investments decisions poses a risk that developers 
may have too little time to realize the projects. A price floor could be set as a guaranteed 
minimum certificate price or a lower bound for the sum of the power and certificate price 
combined. With a price floor, the risk for investors would be lower since the price floor, which is 
activated if the price falls below the floor, would provide a higher remuneration than without a 
price floor. However, by obscuring the information in the price signals, prices could be kept 
artificially high in periods where low prices should reflect a large certificate surplus. Artificially 
high prices would in turn encourage a too high investment level, fuelling the risk of 
overinvestment in too many and too expensive RES-E projects. Due to large potential production 
volumes available in the RES-E project pipeline and the risk of overinvestment, we do not 
recommend that the regulators introduce a price floor. Moreover, a price floor could give a 
higher total support level, thus creating a greater add-on to consumer costs, in particular if too 
many and too expensive RES-E plants are built.  
8.2 Borrowing 
A borrowing mechanism implies that the obliged party can borrow certificates from future 
production (shorting) and therefore do not have to cancel the exact number of certificates 
corresponding to the quota obligation. Borrowing is currently not possible in the Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market. If the regulators are concerned with end-user costs 
becoming excessively high in situations with certificate shortages and high penalty fees, the 
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flexibility in a borrowing mechanism could limit the end-user costs. Moreover, it has been 
suggested in the literature that borrowing, at least to a limited extent, may also reduce price 
fluctuations more than what certificate banking does (Amundsen, Baldursson, & Mortensen, 
2006). We consider the main drawback of introducing a borrowing mechanism to be that the 
currently considerable certificate surplus could retain towards 2035 and therefore remove 
expectations of certificate shortages. Moreover, the regulatory framework may become overly 
complicated and make it increasingly difficult to process and predict market developments. 
8.3 Information to the market 
The lack of perfect information regarding the supply and demand in the certificate market was 
discussed in section 6. We believe that the regulators could minimize the risk to the investors by 
increasing market transparency. On the supply side, increased transparency regarding the status 
of RES-E projects in the pipeline could reduce the risk of overinvestment and provide potential 
investors with sufficient information necessary to assess future prices and thus the expected 
return on investment. This could be achieved by introducing a common register including the 
status of RES-E projects in the pipeline in Norway and Sweden. We believe that such a register 
should, at least, contain the RES-E projects that have reached an investment decision and those 
that are under construction together with information on the project’s planned installed capacity 
and expected electricity production contributing towards the quota target. Moreover, we suggest 
that potential investors should be obliged to notify the regulatory authorities once they make an 
investment decision and that it is the role of the regulatory authorities to make the information 
publicly available. It is crucial that the same set of information is provided in both countries at 
the same time, in order to avoid information asymmetry. By providing the market with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions, regulators can contribute to a more predictable 
investment environment. The regulatory authorities should investigate whether the savings to 
society from reducing supply uncertainty is greater than the cost of developing and maintaining 
such a register, in which case a register should be implemented. Furthermore, the regulatory 
authorities in Norway and Sweden play a key role in the distribution of information regarding 
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changes to the policy. Since the market price is highly sensitive to such information, it is crucial 
that it is made available in equal form and at the same time to all market participants.  
8.4 Quota curve adjustments 
Electricity certificate prices are sensitive to the given quota, and regulators could reduce 
uncertainty on the demand side. Currently, the quota obligation is given as a percentage of 
electricity consumption, and the actual electricity consumption may deviate from what was 
forecasted for the policy period. Since the quota obligation is written in law, quota curve 
adjustments is an extensive process and are therefore scheduled to be revised only every four 
years. We believe that the short time frame of the system requires more frequent adjustments to 
reduce uncertainty regarding the demand for certificates. If there are large deviations between 
actual and forecasted demand, imbalances between issued and cancelled certificates occur, 
affecting electricity certificate prices. By regularly updating the quota curve to new forecasts, for 
example every year, market participants would be provided with a more correct signal on 
whether there is a need for more or less investments in order to meet the quantitative target. 
Furthermore, the regulators could require more frequently updated information on electricity 
consumption and corresponding certificate demand and make such information available to 
market participants. This could possibly contribute to increased trade in electricity certificates 
throughout the year and more accurate electricity certificate prices and therefore reduce the 
uncertainty related to the demand. Furthermore, if a situation of overinvestments arises in 2020, 
the regulators may choose to interfere in the market to keep the certificate price at an appropriate 
level. If a price floor is not introduced, the regulators could apply a mechanism referred to as 
back-loading in which certificates are temporarily withdrawn from the market in order to reduce 
the oversupply.   
 
In the on-going system review, it has been suggested that quota curves for Norway and Sweden 
should be given as an absolute number of certificates (TWh) to be cancelled rather than 
percentages of expected electricity consumption. This could reduce the uncertainty concerning 
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certificate demand and completely remove the uncertainty related to regulatory adjustments due 
to forecasting errors. Figure 41 shows what an absolute quota obligation could look like.  
 
Figure 41: An absolute quota obligation in Norway35 
8.5 Long-term contracts 
Long-term contracts may be necessary to secure financing and reduce price uncertainty for 
investors. Today, price and volume information on long-term contracts are publicly available 
through NECS and Cesar when the transaction is made, but not on the date of agreement. 
Publicly available information on the agreed price and volume in long-term contracts for future 
delivery should be made available in order to improve the market transparency and price signal. 
Furthermore, improved transparency in the financial markets for electricity certificates could 
further reduce price uncertainty.  
  
We believe that facilitating for increased trade on an exchange, such as Nasdaq OMX, would 
improve the functioning of the market since the exchange provides a transparent price signal to 
the market. As the market is expected to encompass an increasingly higher volume of certificates 
this type of trade in electricity certificates could develop naturally. More standardised products 
                                            
 
35 Based on Norway’s obligation to finance 198 TWh of new RES-E capacity over the period 2012-2035 (13.2 TWh 
for 15 years). Generation from the transition period will come in addition since their production cannot be known on 
beforehand.  
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are likely needed, in particular in contracts with a maturity of 5 years or more. Allowing a third 
party exchange to make transfers between accounts in NECS/Cesar with stringent requirements 
for reporting would be one way to facilitate transparent trade. 
8.6 Gracing period  
The 2020 deadline in Norway poses a risk to investors of not becoming eligible for electricity 
certificates due to project delays. The risk could be reduced by adding more flexibility to the 
time limit (gracing period) or by setting the limit according to the 26.4 TWh quantitative target 
without a time limit.  
 
A gracing period similar to Sweden would reduce the risk of non-completion of projects that are 
under construction in Norway close to 2020. A gracing period is unlikely to incentivise investors 
to defer investments since projects that enter during the gracing period will not receive 
certificates for the full 15 years. We believe that an introduction a gracing period of at least a 
year would considerably reduce this risk of exclusion from the support scheme due to project 
delays that arise from factors outside the control of the investor. However, such a solution would 
not mitigate the risk of overshooting the quantitative mandate. A deadline that is disconnected 
from a specific point in time, but rather related to the target of 26.4 TWh could reduce the risk of 
over- or underinvestment. Downsides to such a solution could be that a rush of investments 
occurs because of a time pressure to be included in the 26.4 TWh target. The time pressure could 
potentially distort the quality of the projects that are included, resulting in a situation where it is 
not necessarily the best projects that are realized due to project deferring factors such as grid 
connection. 
 
We believe that a hybrid solution would the best option for the Swedish-Norwegian electricity 
certificate market. By keeping the 2020 deadline, market participants will continue to plan 
according to the time limit. If, however, at the end of 2020, the quota target of 26.4 TWh is not 
met, RES-E projects according to the remaining capacity could be realized in order to fulfil the 
quota. Regardless, we deem it essential that the same time limit apply in both countries.  
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9 Conclusion 
In 2012, Norway and Sweden introduced a common, market-based tradable electricity certificate 
system to stimulate investments in new RES-E capacity corresponding to 26.4 TWh each year by 
2020. The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the risk and uncertainty related to investments in 
new RES-E generation capacity under the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market, both 
in terms of risks faced by potential wind power investors and potential effects on the policy 
outcome.  
 
Potential investors will base their decision on an expectation that future price of power and 
electricity certificates cover their LRMC, including SRMC, average fixed costs and a risk 
premium. Based on LCOE calculations, we estimate that the LRMC of Norwegian wind power 
projects that have received a licence are in the range of 438-617 NOK/MWh. RES-E investors in 
the Nordic energy-only power market face uncertain revenues due to price and volume risk. 
Power prices are highly volatile and difficult to forecast, although the financial market provides 
possibilities for price hedging. The sale of electricity certificates provides RES-E generators with 
an additional source of income, however the uncertainty related to future electricity certificate 
prices is a concern to both potential investors and financiers. The electricity certificate market is 
a long-term policy in which the electricity certificate price should signal the need for more or 
less investments in new RES-E capacity in order to reach the politically determined quantitative 
target in a cost-effective manner. The demand for certificates is ensured by imposing a quota 
obligation on electricity suppliers that is gradually increased towards 2020 in order to stimulate 
supply of new RES-E investments. The supply side consists of the electricity certificates issued 
to RES-E generation eligible for electricity certificates, and the LRMC of the last project needed 
to reach the target should signal the revenue-generating price level needed to stimulate new RES-
E investments corresponding to the quantitative target. So far, 10.3 TWh of new RES-E capacity 
counting towards the target has come online and we construct a static cost resource curve to 
evaluate the additional realisable potential of new RES-E projects in Norway and Sweden. 
Despite the sizable amount of Norwegian wind power projects in the pipeline, we estimate that 
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only an additional 3.5 TWh has the potential to contribute to the quantitative target, which 
implies that only the very best projects should come online. We find that the marginal project is 
likely to be a Swedish wind power plant with a LRMC around 510 NOK/MWh. Technology 
learning has the potential to reduce future energy costs, which influences the expected long run 
electricity certificate price. 
 
The currently low power- and electricity certificate prices are delaying investments in wind 
power because market actors are hesitant to invest when prices are low, and financiers generally 
require long-term contracts to provide non-recourse financing. We identify challenges to 
potential investors and discuss how the precarious design of the market mechanism influences 
current and expected certificate prices. Fundamentally, the lack of information and uncertainty 
related to the supply and demand for certificates introduces a risk that the quantitative target is 
missed. In particular, the sizable amount of RES-E projects in the pipeline introduces an 
asymmetric downside risk of due to industry-wide overinvestment and price spoilage after 2020, 
which makes it plausible that investors demand a risk premium. Moreover, the availability of 
long-term contracts for hedging of future electricity certificate prices is identified as a key for 
realizing investments, particularly for wind power, due to relatively high capital costs. We find 
indications that the presence of a risk premium could increase the cost of new capacity and 
potentially result in a higher policy cost for the electricity consumers in Norway and Sweden.  
 
We suggest how the regulators of the common Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market 
could play a role in reducing the risks related to the demand and supply of certificates by 
modifying some of the market design elements. We find that the key to ensure deployment of 
new RES-E within the current policy at the lowest cost to the consumers is improved 
transparency regarding the RES-E project pipeline status and in the trading places for electricity 
certificates. Moreover, the regulators should take measures to ensure that the demand for 
certificates provides more correct signals to potential investors of how much new RES-E 
capacity is needed in order to reach the quantitative target. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Investor type classification  
  
 
Utility type owners 
Project name Licence applicant Licenced capacity (MW) 
Roan FOSEN VIND AS 300 
Storheia FOSEN VIND AS 220 
Geitfjellet (SAE Vind DA) STATKRAFT AGDER ENERGI VIND DA 210 
Tellenes TELLENES VINDPARK DA 200 
Guleslettene GULESLETTENE VINDKRAFT AS 160 
Songkjølen and Engerfjellet E.ON WIND NORWAY 155 
Bjerkreim (Eikeland-Steinsland)  BJERKREIM VIND AS 150 
Svarthammaren/Pållifjellet STATKRAFT AGDER ENERGI VIND DA 150 
Sørmarkfjellet  SAREPTA ENERGI AS 150 
Dalsbotnfjellet ZEPHYR AS 150 
Remmafjellet STATKRAFT AGDER ENERGI VIND DA 130 
Hamnefjell HAMNEFJELL VINDKRAFT AS 120 
Kvenndalsfjellet FOSEN VIND AS 120 
Innvordfjellet ZEPHYR AS 115 
Kvitvola/Gråhøgda  AUSTRI KVITVOLA DA 110 
Raskiftet AUSTRI RASKIFTET DA 110 
Hitra 2 STATKRAFT AGDER ENERGI VIND DA 110 
Harbakfjellet TRØNDERENERGI KRAFT AS 90,75 
Høgås and Joarknatten  E.ON Vind Sverige AB 90 
Sørfjord NORDKRAFT VIND AS 90 
Stokkfjellet TRØNDERENERGI KRAFT AS 90 
Storehei  E.ON WIND NORWAY 80 
Haram HARAM KRAFT AS 66 
Måkaknuten LYSE PRODUKSJON AS 66 
Frøya SAREPTA ENERGI AS 60 
Kvinesheia  STATKRAFT AGDER ENERGI VIND DA 60 
Ånstadblåheia VESTERÅLSKRAFT VIND AS 50 
Lutelandet  LUTELANDET ENERGIPARK AS 45 
Kjølberget  AUSTRI VIND DA 40 
Hennøy VESTAVIND KRAFT AS 35 
Bukkanibba  LYSE PRODUKSJON AS 30 
Svåheia BJERKREIM VIND AS 24 
Vågsvåg ZEPHYR AS 24 
Okla VESTAVIND KRAFT AS 21 
Testområde Stadt VESTAVIND KRAFT AS 10 
Vikna NTE ENERGI AS 9 
Haugøya testturbin STATKRAFT AS 8 
Bessakerfjellet II TRØNDERENERGI KRAFT AS 4 
Hundhammerfjellet - demo II NTE ENERGI AS 3 
Mehuken 3 (+ tidl. Mehuken 1) KVALHEIM KRAFT DA 2,75 
Hundhammerfjellet - demo I NTE ENERGI AS 1,65 
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Investor type: Individual Power Producer (IPP) 
Project name Licence applicant Licenced apacity (MW) 
Kalvvatnan FRED OLSEN RENEWABLES AS 225 
Gilja FRED OLSEN RENEWABLES AS 135 
Egersund NORSK VIND EGERSUND AS 110 
Gravdal FRED OLSEN RENEWABLES AS 90 
Skinansfjellet NORSK VIND SKINANSFJELLET AS 90 
Dalbygda DALBYGDA VINDKRAFT AS 42 
Tysvær ALPIQ ECOPOWER SCANDINAVIA AS 39 
Skorveheia NORSK VIND ENERGI AS 36 
Gismarvik FRED OLSEN RENEWABLES AS 15 
Storøy SOLVIND PROSJEKT AS 6 
Vardøya NORD-NORSK VINDKRAFT AS 6 
Friestad SOLVIND PROSJEKT AS 2,4 
Røyrmyra NORSK VIND ENERGI AS 2,4 
 
 
 
 
Diversified company 
Project name Licence applicant Licenced capacity (MW) 
Skurvenuten ASKO ROGALAND AS 10 
Tindafjellet ASKO ROGALAND AS 10 
 
Developer 
Project name Licence applicant Licenced capacity (MW) 
Øyfjellet  EOLUS VIND NORGE AS 330 
Kvitfjell NORSK MILJØKRAFT TROMSØ AS 200 
Tonstad TONSTAD VINDPARK AS 200 
Andmyran ANDMYRAN VINDPARK AS 160 
Skveneheii SKVENEHEII VINDKRAFT AS 120 
Raudfjell  NORSK MILJØKRAFT RAUDFJELL AS 100 
Faurefjellet HYBRID TECHNOLOGY AS 60 
Vardafjellet VARDAFJELLET VINDKRAFT AS 30 
Dønnesfjord VINDKRAFT NORD AS 10 
Maurneset vindkraftverk VINDKRAFT NORD AS 10 
Sandhaugen teststasjon 
NORSK MILJØKRAFT FORSKNING & 
UTVIKLING AS 9 
 
Publicly owned non-energy company 
Project name Licence applicant Licenced capacity (MW) 
Stigafjellet  STIGAFJELL VIND AS 30 
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Appendix B: LCOE calculations and assumptions  
Name 
Expected 
installed 
capacity MW 
Expected 
generation 
GWh 
Full 
load 
hours 
Capacity 
factor 
O&M 
cNOK
/kWh 
Investment 
cost, million 
NOK/MW 
LCOE 
NOK/ 
MWh 
Kvitvola/Gråhøgda  110,0 376,8 3425 39 % 12,5 11,4 467 
Raskiftet 110,0 357,5 3250 37 % 13,5 12,6 532 
Kjølberget  40,0 119,6 2990 34 % 12,5 13,1 572 
Dalbygda 29,9 91,8 3070 35 % 15,5 11,6 545 
Høgås and Joarknatten  62,1 198,9 3203 37 % 12,5 11,5 493 
Songkjølen and Engerfjellet 144,5 433,5 3000 34 % 12,5 11,4 514 
Storehei  87,0 282,9 3252 37 % 12,5 12,6 523 
Øyfjellet  314,5 1163,7 3700 42 % 13,5 11,9 466 
Roan 300,0 870,0 2900 33 % 10,0 12,0 521 
Storheia 220,0 616,0 2800 32 % 10,0 12,0 535 
Kvenndalsfjellet 100,0 260,0 2600 30 % 10,0 12,0 568 
Gilja 135,0 405,0 3000 34 % 13,5 12,0 544 
Kalvvatnan 216,0 648,0 3000 34 % 17,0 11,0 550 
Guleslettene 144,0 432,0 3000 34 % 12,0 10,0 462 
Hamnefjell 120,0 340,0 2833 32 % 13,5 13,4 617 
Faurefjellet 60,0 180,0 3000 34 % 15,0 12,8 588 
Lutelandet  45,0 121,5 2700 31 % 14,0 11,5 576 
Måkaknuten 66,0 195,7 2965 34 % 15,0 12,5 583 
Bukkanibba  30,0 90,0 3000 34 % 15,5 11,3 543 
Sørfjord 72,0 227,2 3155 36 % 15,0 11,7 531 
Raudfjell  100,0 284,0 2840 32 % 16,5 11,1 569 
Egersund 105,0 304,5 2900 33 % 13,5 12,0 558 
Skorveheia 36,0 104,4 2900 33 % 11,5 11,0 503 
Sørmarkfjellet  150,0 420,0 2800 32 % 10,0 12,0 535 
Frøya 60,0 160,0 2667 30 % 12,5 11,6 568 
Skveneheii 90,0 270,0 3000 34 % 15,0 11,5 545 
Hitra 2 58,9 164,9 2800 32 % 13,5 13,0 609 
Kvinesheia  60,0 162,0 2700 31 % 14,0 9,0 484 
Geitfjellet 159,0 429,9 2704 31 % 13,5 11,5 570 
Svarthammaren/Pållifjellet 150,0 405,0 2700 31 % 13,5 11,8 581 
Remmafjellet 130,0 384,8 2960 34 % 13,5 11,2 523 
Stigafjellet  27,8 84,5 3037 35 % 13,0 13,0 567 
Tellenes 192,0 518,4 2700 31 % 14,6 10,8 556 
Tonstad 192,0 622,1 3240 37 % 15,0 11,0 501 
Stokkfjellet 80,0 252,0 3150 36 % 16,5 11,1 530 
Vardafjellet 30,0 90,0 3000 34 % 15,0 8,3 438 
Hennøy 33,0 99,0 3000 34 % 13,5 11,5 528 
Ånstadblåheia 32,2 86,9 2700 31 % 14,0 12,0 595 
Dalsbotnfjellet 150,0 450,0 3000 34 % 13,5 11,2 518 
Innvordfjellet 115,0 341,2 2967 34 % 11,0 12,0 522 
Gravdal 86,0 267,1 3106 35 % 15,0 13,3 589 
Skinansfjellet 90,0 297,0 3300 38 % 13,0 12,5 518 
Bjerkreim(Eikeland-Steinsland)  146,1 427,0 2922 33 % 15,0 13,1 608 
Andmyran  No information available 
Reference project 108,8 326,4 2975 34 % 13,5 11,7 538,9 
LCOE assumptions: Escalation rate (e): 1%, Plant life (T): 20 years, Discount rate (r) 7.7%, Hours per 
year (H): 8760. Information on operation and maintenance costs were missing for 8 projects, in which 
case the average of the other project’s O&M costs, 13.5 cent NOK/kWh, are assumed. 
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Appendix C: Quota curves for Sweden and Norway 
Year 
Quota curve 
Sweden* 
New quota curve 
Sweden** 
Quota curve 
Norway* 
New quota curve 
Norway*** 
2003 7,4 % 
   2004 8,1 % 
   2005 10,4 % 
   2006 12,6 % 
   2007 15,1 % 
   2008 16,3 % 
   2009 17,0 % 
   2010 17,9 % 
   2011 17,9 % 
   2012 17,9 % 
 
3,0 % 
 2013 13,5 % 
 
4,9 % 
 2014 14,2 % 
 
6,9 % 
 2015 14,3 % 14,3 % 8,8 % 8,8 % 
2016 14,4 % 23,0 % 10,8 % 11,9 % 
2017 15,2 % 24,6 % 12,7 % 13,7 % 
2018 16,8 % 26,2 % 14,6 % 15,4 % 
2019 18,1 % 27,6 % 16,5 % 17,2 % 
2020 19,5 % 26,6 % 18,3 % 19,7 % 
2021 19,0 % 25,0 % 18,2 % 19,6 % 
2022 18,0 % 23,5 % 18,1 % 19,6 % 
2023 17,0 % 22,2 % 18,0 % 19,5 % 
2024 16,1 % 20,5 % 17,9 % 19,3 % 
2025 14,9 % 18,4 % 17,6 % 18,6 % 
2026 13,7 % 16,1 % 16,4 % 17,4 % 
2027 12,4 % 14,0 % 15,1 % 15,6 % 
2028 10,7 % 12,4 % 13,2 % 13,1 % 
2029 9,2 % 10,8 % 11,3 % 10,9 % 
2030 7,6 % 9,1 % 9,4 % 9,0 % 
2031 6,1 % 7,1 % 7,5 % 7,2 % 
2032 4,5 % 5,3 % 5,6 % 5,4 % 
2033 2,8 % 3,7 % 3,7 % 3,6 % 
2034 1,2 % 2,1 % 1,8 % 1,8 % 
2035 0,8 % 1,3 % 0,9 % 0,9 % 
* Original quota curves, stipulated in the Swedish and Norwegian Electricity Certificate Act (Olje- 
og energidepartementet, 2012) 
** New quota curve for Sweden after 2015 adjustment, suggested by the Swedish Energy Agency 
(Energimyndigheten a, 2014) 
*** New quota curve for Norway after 2015 adjustment, suggested by NVE (NVE c, 2014) 
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Appendix D: Estimated demand for electricity certificates in TWh (million certificates) 
Year Sweden 13.2 TWh Norway 13.2 TWh 
Swedish 
transition period 
Norwegian 
transition period 
2004 
  
5,1 
 2005 
  
10,1 
 2006 
  
12,3 
 2007 
  
14,6 
 2008 
  
15,6 
 2009 
  
16,0 
 2010 
  
16,2 
 2011 
  
17,5 
 2012 1,5 1,5 15,08 0,8 
2013 2,9 2,9 9,67 0,7 
2014 4,4 4,4 8,84 0,7 
2015 5,9 5,9 7,45 1,2 
2016 7,3 7,3 15,91 2,2 
2017 8,8 8,8 16,24 2,2 
2018 10,3 10,3 16,32 2,1 
2019 11,7 11,7 16,25 2,1 
2020 13,2 13,2 13,16 2,8 
2021 13,2 13,2 11,25 2,8 
2022 13,2 13,2 9,60 2,8 
2023 13,2 13,2 8,22 2,7 
2024 13,2 13,2 6,36 2,6 
2025 13,2 13,2 4,15 2,0 
2026 12,3 12,3 2,72 2,0 
2027 11,1 11,1 1,79 1,7 
2028 10,7 10,7 0,67 
 2029 8,9 8,9 0,94 
 2030 7,4 7,4 0,93 
 2031 5,9 5,9 0,54 
 2032 4,4 4,4 0,37 
 2033 3,0 3,0 0,40 
 2034 1,5 1,5 0,43 
 2035 0,7 0,7 0,44 
 Demand is found by multiplying the annual percentage quota obligation by yearly expected electricity 
consumption in TWh  
* Demand prior to 2015 are based on actual certificate cancellations, while demand estimates as of 2015 
are based on suggested new quota curves  
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Appendix E: Policy cost calculation 
Year 
Quota 
obligation 
(TWh)* 
Price 
(NOK/MWh)** 
Additional cost 
(NOK/MWh)*** 
Nominal cost 
(MNOK) 
Present value 
(MNOK)**** 
2012  2.23  140.8 45.8  415.92   415.92  
2013  3.64  177.3 57.6  855.38   855.38  
2014  5.13  164.2 53.4  1 115.25   1 115.25  
2015  7.05  137.8 44.8  1 287.01   1 287.01  
2016  9.53  132,8 43.1  1 677.10   1 677.10  
2017  10.98  135.0 43.9  1 964.10   1 916.19  
2018  12.35  137.7 44.7  2 252.65   2 144.11  
2019  13.79  141.3 45.9  2 582.50   2 398.11  
2020  16.02  144.9 47.1  3 074.97   2 785.77  
2021  15.95  155.0 50.4  3 275.88   2 895.40  
2022  15.97  155.0 50.4  3 279.16   2 827.61  
2023  15.90  155.0 50.4  3 265.69   2 747.31  
2024  15.75  155.0 50.4  3 235.43   2 655.47  
2025  15.20  155.0 50.4  3 120.92   2 499.01  
2026  14.23  155.0 50.4  2 922.49   2 283.04  
2027  12.77  155.0 50.4  2 622.78   1 998.94  
2028  10.73  155.0 50.4  2 204.67   1 639.29  
2029  8.94  155.0 50.4  1 836.25   1 332.06  
2030  7.38  155.0 50.4  1 515.67   1 072.68  
2031  5.91  155.0 50.4  1 213.75   838.05  
2032  4.44  155.0 50.4  911.22   613.82  
2033  2.96  155.0 50.4  608.09   399.63  
2034  1.48  155.0 50.4  304.35   195.14  
2035  0.74  155.0 50.4  152.33   95.28  
Sum  229.07       45 693.55   38 687.57  
* Quota obligation for Norway includes demand from transmission period and new generation 
** We use actual, average certificate prices for 2012 – 2015 (NOK), Forward prices for 2016 - 2020 (available 
12.05.15) (SKM, 2015), while prices 2020 – 2035 are assumed to be the average of historic prices (2012-2015) All 
prices are converted using exchange rate SEK/NOK = 0.9. 
*** VAT of 25 per cent and administration costs of 7.5 per cent (NVE c, 2014) are assumed. 
**** Present value is based on a 2.5 per cent discount rate equal to the Norwegian inflation target. 
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